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LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND TAX POLICY
PATRICIA L. BRYANt
In recent years the leveraged buyout, a corporate acquisition in
which a publicly-held corporation is taken private by a group of investors
who finance the purchase largely with borrowed money, has become in-
creasingly popular. The popularity of the leveraged buyout has gener-
ated much controversy within the business community; part of this
controversy involves the role offederal income tax provisions in this area
Critics of leveraged buyouts argue that the corporate interest deduction
provides incentives for leveraged buyouts that would not be justified on
financial or economic grounds alone.
In this Article Professor Bryan examines the tax code's impact on
the recent increases in leveraged buyouts. Professor Bryan argues that
although critics of leveraged buyouts have focused on the interest deduc-
tion, attention must be given to the overall consistency of the tax conse-
quences of leveraged buyouts with the existing structure and underlying
policy of the tax provisions. After describing the leveraged buyout and
comparing its tax consequences to a theoretical model, Professor Bryan
concludes that the primary tax incentive for leveraged buyouts has been
the preference for capital gains at the shareholder level rather than the
corporate interest deduction. Professor Bryan proposes various methods
that would eliminate the tax incentive for leveraged buyouts and help
achieve a more neutral and coherent tax policy.
This Article was completed before the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which eliminated, for now, the preferential treatment for capital gains.
In the Afterword Professor Bryan shows that the tax incentive for the
leveraged buyout has not been eliminated by the repeal of the capital
gains preference. Even without the preferential rate for capital gains,
certain forms of distributions to shareholders will continue to be tax-
preferred. Thus, Professor Bryan concludes that the tax bias toward
leveraged buyouts will remain a significant factor in corporate financial
decisions under the new law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The stock market explosion of recent years has been accompanied by a dra-
matic upsurge in the number of corporate mergers and acquisitions, described as
the "fourth major merger wave since the turn of the century."1 One of the most
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1. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
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common types of transactions is the leveraged buyout, in which a publicly held
corporation is taken private by a group of investors who finance the purchase
largely with borrowed money.2 Typically, a substantial portion of the debt is
secured by the assets or the stock of the acquired corporation, and the full
amount is to be repaid out of the corporation's future cash flow. Over the past
several years, equity investors in these acquisitions, usually including unrelated
parties as well as corporate managers, have realized spectacular and widely pub-
licized gains through stock appreciation.3 Consequently, the number of lever-
aged buyouts has continued to rise, with the sizes of the target companies
increasing to the billions of dollars.
4
The leveraged buyout market has also changed in other ways over the past
few years. The acquisitions now are often initiated by investment bankers rather
ASPECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND OTHER CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (AND S.
420, S. 476, AND S. 632) 2 (1985) [hereinafter HOSTILE TAKEOVERS]. According to those statistics,
the amount spent on mergers and acquisitions increased by almost 70% from 1983 to 1984, rising
from $73.1 billion in 1983 to $122.2 billion in 1984.
2. A leveraged buyout can also be structured as an acquisition of a subsidiary or a division of a
publicly held corporation instead of the entire company.
3. Many of these gains are realized by investors when the corporation that has been taken
private in a leveraged buyout is subsequently resold to the public. One of the most widely publicized
payoffs was realized by an investor group headed by former Treasury Secretary William Simon,
which purchased Gibson Greeting Card in the early 1980s for $81 million, borrowing $80 million.
When Gibson was later sold to the public, the investors made $100 million on their initial cash
investment of $1 million. See Adkins, Why Leveraged Buyouts Are Getting Riskier, DUN'S Bus.
MONTH, Apr. 1984, at 33, 34; see also Ross, How the ChampsDoLeveragedBuyouts, FORTUNE, Jan.
23, 1984, at 70 ("Not the least of the claims of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., the nation's leading
specialist in leveraged buyouts, is that the equity invested in its deals has grown at the extraordinary
average annual rate of 62%."); Sloan, The Magician, FORBES, Apr. 23, 1984, at 32, 34 [hereinafter
Sloan, The Magician] ("At minimum, the [leveraged] buyout [of Metromedia, Inc.] makes [John
Kluge, the primary equity investor] a centimillionaire. At maximum, he has a shot at being a bil-
lionaire."); Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, FORBES, Apr. 9, 1984, at 39 [hereinafter Sloan, Luring
Banks Overboard] (describing leveraged buyouts as "Wall Street's equivalent of the philosophers'
stone, that mythical substance that turned ordinary metal into gold [which] have produced payoffs
as large as 200-to-I for some happy investors.").
4. The investment banking firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. has been responsible for
much of the growth in the leveraged buyout market. Prior to 1979 leveraged buyouts rarely involved
more than $100 million. In 1979 Kohlberg purchased Houdaille Industries in a leveraged acquisi-
tion for $355 million, with larger deals to follow. See Ross, supra note 3, at 74. In November 1985
Beatrice accepted an offer from Kohlberg to purchase the company for $6.2 billion, a transaction
that would be the largest leveraged buyout as of that date. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1985, at 2, col. 2.
Other leveraged buyouts in the billions of dollars have included the acquisition by Kohlberg of
Storer Communications in April 1985 for $2.5 billion and Pantry Pride's buyout of Revlon in No-
vember 1985 for $1.8 billion. See Cole, Big Players in 1985, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, at F7, col. 1,
col. 2; see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 98th Cong., 2d Sess., LEVERAGED BUYOUTS:
SOUND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING OR WALL STREET ALCHEMY? 10 (1984) [hereinafter LEVER-
AGED BUYOUTS] (listing the largest leveraged buyouts up to late 1984); Roster Highlights: Top 25
Transactions; Quarterly Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jan./Feb. 1986, at 85, 87; Mar./Apr.
1986, at 89, 91 (statistics on leveraged buyouts during the third and fourth quarters of 1985); A
Feverish Market, MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONS, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 45 (statistics on leveraged buyouts
during the first two quarters of 1986).
In addition to the dramatic gains realized by investors, reasons cited to explain the increase in
the number and size of leveraged buyouts have included: the rise in divestiture of unprofitable divi-
sions or subsidiaries by large, publicly held companies, see Miller, What's Next for Leveraged
Buyouts?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1983, at 97, 98; significant changes in available financing
sources, see id. at 101-02; Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 41; increasing use as an
anti-takeover defense, see Ross, supra note 3, at 72; and declining interest rates, see Weiss, ABCs of
LBOs, BARRONS, Aug. 19, 1985, at 42.
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than by the corporation's existing management.5 In addition, the purposes of
leveraged buyouts are more varied, with such buyouts now frequently appearing
in hostile takeover attempts, both as acquisition techniques 6 and as defenses by
management against unwelcome suitors.
7
The recent popularity of leveraged buyouts has generated controversy
within the business community.8 Some financial analysts have viewed the trend
with alarm, and the success of leveraged buyouts has been called a "prelude to
disaster."9 Expressing concern over the "leveraging-up of American enter-
prise," some commentators emphasize the extreme vulnerability of firms with
heavy debt to slight downturns in business conditions or the economy.10 Others
stress the additional risks arising from the increased participation of more inex-
perienced investors, who may evaluate a target less carefully, bidding prices up
to unrealistic levels and borrowing excessive amounts." Finally, some commen-
tators discuss the lack of fairness to the public shareholders who are eliminated
in a leveraged buyout, focusing on the inherent conflict of interest of a corpora-
5. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 730, 736 (1985) (describing the
buyout market as having become "increasingly institutionalized").
6. See Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 736 (stating that "MBO's [management buyouts] have in
effect merged with that other recent phenomenon, hostile takeovers"); see also Bianco, How Drexel's
Wunderkind Bankrolls the Raiders, Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 1985, at 90 (financing "corporate predators"
through sales of "junk bonds"); Stewart, Kohlberg Bid for Beatrice May Portend a Spate of Hostile
Leveraged Buyouts, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1985, at 5, col. 1 (characterizing lender's acceptance of
buyouts hostile to management as "a new wrinkle").
7. See HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 1, at 19; Miller, supra note 4, at 97-98.
8. Some of the main issues in the controversy are summarized in a report prepared by the
Congressional Research Service in November 1984. See LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, supra note 4. The
report was prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. It
was intended to give an overview of the changes in the leveraged buyout market, providing informa-
tion on increasing legislative concern "regarding the fairness of the transactions and use of debt
beyond conventional norms." Id. at 1.
9. See Adkins, supra note 3, at 33; see also Bus. WK., July 2, 1984, at 72 ("Like any gold rush,
this one [involving leveraged buyouts] is giving rise to fears of a debacle."); Sloan, Luring Banks
Overboard?, supra note 3, at 39 ("[L]ike all good things, leveraged buyouts are showing signs of
wretched excess.").
10. The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, John S.R. Shad, expressed this
concern, stating that "the leveraging-up of American enterprise will magnify the adverse conse-
quences of the next recession or significant rise in interest rates .... The more leveraged takeovers
and buyouts today, the more bankruptcies tomorrow." Bus. WK., supra note 9, at 72. Witnesses
testifying before Congressional committees have also expressed these concerns. See, e.g., Tax Treat-
ment of Hostile Takeover Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the
Senate Comm on Finance on S. 420, 5. 476, and S. 632, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 68 (1985) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings] (statement of James R. Jones, U.S. Representative from Oklahoma).
11. More investors are now able to participate in leveraged buyouts through "blind pools,"
which are equity funds or partnerships formed to provide ready capital for leveraged buyouts. See
LEVERAGED BUYoUTs, supra note 4, at 16; Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 40.
For concerns about increasing debt-equity ratios in firms acquired in leveraged buyouts, which are
often well above industry norms, see LEVERAGED BUYOrrS, supra, note 4 at 22-23; Miller, The
Dark Side of the Leveraged Buyout Boom, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1984, at 183-84. This
change in debt-equity ratios, resulting both from increases in corporate debt and decreases in re-
tained earnings, is reflective of a general trend in United States industry over the last several years.
See Silk, The Peril Behind the Takeover Boom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, at F6, cols. 4-5 (according
to Henry Kaufman, executive director and chief economist of Salomon Brothers, "[F]rom the start
of 1984 to mid-1985, the sum of nonfinancial corporations' retained earnings and new equities issued
(minus stock retirements due to mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts) was a negative $53
billion, while in the same period corporate debt rose by $233 billion").
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tion's management that participates on both sides of the transaction.1 2
Although these concerns are widely publicized in the financial press, lever-
aged buyouts also have strong advocates who argue that the change in corporate
ownership improves market allocation of resources and creates shareholder
gains through higher productivity and efficiency.1 3 These advocates emphasize
the increased incentive of managers who typically hold a significant equity inter-
est in the firm as a result of the buyout and the managers' new commitment to
cutting unnecessary costs and eliminating wasteful overhead.1 4 Defenders of
buyouts also stress the ability of managers of a privately held firm to focus on
long-range planning without the pressure imposed by the stock market to show
continual rises in earnings per share.15 The increased reliance on debt financing
is seen to be of little concern, with some commentators citing the much higher
levels of corporate debt in other countries.1 6
As leveraged buyouts have become more popular and more controversial,
the role of the federal income tax provisions in this area has come under in-
creased scrutiny. 17 It is generally agreed that it is important to understand
12. Fairness to the public shareholders involves several different issues, including the role of the
managers in structuring the deal, their responsibility for disclosure, the fairness of the price, and the
remedies for shareholders challenging the transaction. For a summary of the legal literature on
these issues, see LEVERAGED BuYouTs, supra note 4, at 33-40.
13. See LEVERAGED BuyoUrs, supra note 4, at 1, 3; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 729-30 (1982); Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections
on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HoFsRA L. REV. 183, 235 (1979); Roundtable:
The Leveraged Buyout Market, MERGERS & AcQuISrnoNS, Summer 1984, at 26-27 [hereinafter
Roundtable].
14. See Ferenbach & Mancuso, Leveraged Buyout-A Powerful Tool for Assertive Management,
MGMT. REV., Nov. 1983, at 59, 60-61; Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 109, 112; Roundtable, supra note 13, at 27-28, 34.
15. Perham, The Joys and Woes of Managing an LBO, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, Sept. 1985, at 40-
41; Roundtable, supra note 13, at 36.
16. Roundtable, supra note 13, at 31. It has also been argued that, for some companies, in-
creased debt may serve as an effective control of agency costs, requiring corporate managers to
distribute free cash flow instead of investing in unproductive projects. See Jensen, Agency Costs of
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. Rv. 323 (1986).
17. Articles in popular business magazines frequently blame the tax laws for encouraging and
subsidizing leveraged buyouts. See, eg., Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 39:
What is this wonderful institution, the leveraged buyout? ... Why are LBOs making so
many people rich?... Credit much of the success of LBOs to our terrible tax laws, espe-
cially to the indefensible corporate income tax.... A key reason for the frenzied growth in
buyouts is that Uncle Sam, in his wisdom, has subsidized the LBO business. Not directly,
of course, but through the tax code.
Id. Legal commentators have also focused on tax benefits as a major incentive for leveraged buyouts.
See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 759-64.
Congressional concern about the role of the tax provisions in encouraging merger activity, in-
cluding leveraged buyouts, is evidenced by a pamphlet prepared by the Congressional Research Ser-
vice. See LEVERAGED BuyouTs, supra note 4. In April 1985 several congressional subcommittees
held hearings concerning the federal income tax aspects of hostile corporate takeovers, including
leveraged buyouts. See Tax Aspects of Acquisitions and Mergers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter House Hearings]; Senate Hearings, supra note 10. The Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared background material for these hearings, describing fed-
eral income tax considerations pertinent to mergers and discussing the policy implications of tax-
motivated mergers. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., FEDERAL
INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (1985); HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note
1042 [Vol. 65
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whether tax considerations have encouraged these transactions, providing incen-
tives for leveraged buyouts that would not be justified on financial or economic
grounds alone. 18 Most commentators also agree that tax incentives should be
eliminated, making tax considerations a neutral factor in this area.1 9 Strong
opponents of leveraged buyouts, however, take a different position, arguing that
the tax provisions should be designed to discourage such transactions.
2 0
The major focus of attention in discussions of tax incentives for leveraged
buyouts has been the corporate interest deduction.21 After the transaction, the
acquired corporation pays substantial amounts of interest on the debt incurred
to finance the leveraged buyout. These interest payments are tax-deductible,
2 2
and thus they significantly reduce the taxes of a corporation that was previously
making nondeductible dividend payments or accumulating amounts out of
which future dividends could be paid. The deductibility of interest on debt, as
opposed to the nondeductibility of dividends paid on stock, is an accepted prin-
ciple under current tax law. Few proponents of reform in the leveraged buyout
context suggest that the distinction be eliminated or argue that the debt involved
should be recharacterized as stock under current judicial and regulatory guide-
lines.23 Nevertheless, some have argued that significant limitations on the de-
18. See HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
19. See, ag., House Hearings, supra note 17, at 129 (statement of David H. Brockway, Chief of
Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation); Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 121 (statement of Ronald A.
Pearlman, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury); see also HOSTILE TAKE-
OVERS, supra note 1, at 14 (presenting arguments for and against the retention of these tax
provisions).
20. See, e.g., Silk, supra note 11, at F6, col. 5.
21. The deduction for interest allowed by I.R.C. § 163 (1985), has been emphasized by business
commentators as the primary tax incentive for leveraged buyouts. See, e.g., Sloan, The Magician,
supra note 3, at 32 (describing the leveraged buyout as "one of those deals in which everyone bene-
fits--everyone except the U.S. Treasury, which subsidizes all leveraged buyouts because of the non-
sensical income tax laws, which make interest costs tax-deductible, thus encouraging borrowing at
the cost of building up equity"). Specific proposals for reform of the tax provisions in this area have
also focused on disallowance of the interest deduction. See, eg., Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Ac-
quisition, 39 TAx LAW. 91, 115-19 (1985) (arguing that the problem of excessive leverage in corpo-
rate acquisitions should be dealt with by denying interest deductions on excessive debt-defined by
reference to specified industry standards-incurred in connection with the acquisition of a control-
ling interest in a corporation by purchase or redemption). Proposals have been introduced in the
Senate that would disallow deductions for interest paid or accrued on debt incurred to acquire cor-
porate stock or assets, but only in the context of certain "hostile" acquisitions. S. 632, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S2789-92 (1985) (introduced by Senator Chafee); S. 476, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S1579-80 (1985) (introduced by Senators Boren and Nickles) (limiting the
disallowance to interest on junior obligations, commonly referred to as "junk bonds"); S. 420, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S1198-99 (1985) (introduced by Senators Boren and Nickles).
The other primary tax benefit that has been blamed for leveraged buyouts has been the in-
creased depreciation deductions that result from the step-up in the bases of the target's assets. See
infra note 52; see also infra note 115 (discussing the elimination of this benefit by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986).
22. The interest deductions would have to be tested under I.R.C. § 279 (1985), which denies
deductions for interest on certain types of acquisition indebtedness. The limited role of this provi-
sion in the leveraged buyout context is discussed in more detail infra note 46.
23. The difficulties in distinguishing between debt and equity are obvious from the problems the
Treasury has had in finalizing regulations under I.R.C. § 385 (1985). Proposed regulations were
published in December 1980, see 45 Fed. Reg. 86445-58, (1980) (codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.385-1 to -
10), but were withdrawn in the face of tremendous controversy. Still in effect, however, are the
general guidelines for distinguishing between debt and equity developed prior to issuance of the
§ 385 proposed regulations. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-122, 1973-1 C.B. 66; Rev. Rul. 68-54, 1968-1
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ductibility of interest on corporate debt incurred in connection with corporate
acquisitions are necessary to prevent the growing trend toward highly leveraged
takeovers of operating companies. 24
Although critics of leveraged buyouts have focused primarily on the inter-
est deduction, little attention has been paid to the overall consistency of the tax
consequences of leveraged buyouts with the existing structure and underlying
policy of the tax provisions. This Article attempts to provide that analysis, illus-
trating the major theoretical inconsistency and urging a different focus for pro-
posals to neutralize the tax provisions in this area.
The conclusion that the corporate interest deduction is the primary tax in-
centive for leveraged buyouts ignores recent legal and economic studies that
have focused on the relationship between the individual and corporate tax struc-
tures under current law. Analysis has shown that the individual and corporate
tax burdens operate in a more compensatory fashion than might be expected
and, under certain assumptions concerning rates of tax and return, achieve tax
neutrality between corporate financial decisions.25 Under this analysis, struc-
tural deviations from the assumptions are the source of tax incentives and, if tax
neutrality is the goal, are the proper focus for reform.
By applying this theoretical analysis to leveraged buyouts, this Article illus-
trates that the currently accepted tax consequences do provide a clear tax incen-
tive for the transaction. The incentive does not, however, arise from the
corporate interest deduction that is available to the company in the years follow-
ing the acquisition. Instead, the major source of the incentive, and therefore the
more appropriate focus for reform, is the cost to the shareholders of the equity
distribution. 26 That cost is computed at the time the shift in ownership occurs,
when the outgoing public shareholders exchange their stock for the proceeds
from the newly-incurred corporate debt. Under current law and administrative
C.B. 69; Levin, Tax Aspects ofLeveraged Buyouts, in LEVERAGED ACQUISITIONS: PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC 113 (1985); see also infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing the characteriza-
tion of the typical notes issued in leveraged buyouts).
24. See, e.g., S. 632, supra note 21, at S2789; Canellos, supra note 21, at 115-17. On January 8,
1986, the Federal Reserve Board adopted a controversial rule that is expected to limit the debt
incurred in connection with leveraged buyouts and hostile takeovers. Under the new rule, a shell
corporation, formed solely for the purpose of the acquisition, would be subject to the Board's margin
requirements. The financing of more than 50% of the purchase price with debt, collateralized with
the acquired stock or assets, would be prohibited. See Lambert & Williams, Fed Board Votes 3-2 to
Restrict the Use of "Junk" Bonds in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
Although the new rule is expected to restrict the issuance of many high-yield, low-grade securities
currently used in leveraged buyouts and referred to as "junk" bonds, Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volcker has predicted that "corporate raiders will find 'innumerable devices' to get around the
new requirement." Id.; see also Ehrlich, 1wilightfor the Lone Raider?, Bus. WK., Jan. 27, 1986, at
38 (discussing the impact of the new regulations on the takeover market).
25. See AMER. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C, REPORTER'S
STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS (1982) [hereinafter AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S
STUDY]; Auerbach, Share Valuation and Corporate Equity Policy, I1 J. PUB. ECON. 291 (1979);
Auerbach, Tax Integration and the "New View" of the Corporate Tax: A 1980"s Perspective, 74 Nat'l
Tax Ass'n Proceedings 21, 22-23 (198 1); Bradford, The Incidence and Allocation of Effects of a Tax
on Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1981); Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy,
and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1973). This analysis is described in more detail infra text
accompanying notes 62-66.
26. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
1044 [Vol. 65
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
rulings, the exchange is treated as a sale, so that the distribution of shareholder
equity is accomplished at the cost of a capital gains tax.27 As the analysis will
show, the preferential capital gains rate is inconsistent with the assumptions of
the theoretical model, which would permit the corporate tax deduction for sub-
sequent interest payments but which achieves neutrality by imposing a share-
holder tax at ordinary rates on all withdrawals of corporate earnings. Allowing
a shareholder withdrawal to be accomplished at a lower cost creates a strong tax
incentive for leveraged buyouts that is wholly independent of their economic or
financial motivation.
The tax incentive created by applying the capital gains rate to the share-
holder withdrawal is hardly unique to leveraged buyouts, although that transac-
tion provides a particularly dramatic illustration. The same incentive exists in
the context of all distributions to shareholders that are taxed to them as sales,
including certain redemptions and liquidations.2" To eliminate tax incentives in
any of these contexts, it is necessary to increase the tax cost of the shareholder
withdrawal of corporate earnings. A higher cost could be imposed in a variety
of ways, such as allocating the distribution to all or some of the shareholders as
a dividend or imposing an excise tax at the corporate level. 29 If one of these
reforms were enacted, certain corporate financial decisions, including the deci-
sion to eliminate public shareholders in a highly leveraged acquisition, would
depend on business and economic factors, without tax considerations as an addi-
tional inducement. Strong arguments can be made that the goal of sound tax
policy should be to achieve such neutrality, so that the tax provisions neither
encourage nor inhibit corporate acquisitions. If, after eliminating tax incentives,
the trend toward leveraged buyouts continues, and if that trend is determined to
be economically or socially undesirable, changes in the securities or banking
laws may well be more effective methods of regulation than additional changes
in the tax provisions.
Part II of this Article describes the mechanics of leveraged buyouts, includ-
ing the basic financial aspects and tax consequences. Part III describes the theo-
retical relationship between the taxes imposed on individuals and corporations
and illustrates how, under certain assumed conditions, tax equivalence is
achieved between corporate financial decisions. After a comparison of the tax
consequences of leveraged buyouts to the theoretical model, the analysis con-
cludes that a significant incentive for the transaction results from the inadequate
cost of the shareholder withdrawal of corporate accumulations rather than from
the subsequent corporate interest deductions. Part IV explains that the incen-
tive inherent in the tax consequences of leveraged buyouts is not unique to that
transaction but exists in other contexts as well. Part IV also briefly describes
27. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the tax consequences to public
shareholders in more detail). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, signed by President Reagan on October
22, 1986, made significant changes in the taxation of capital gains. The Afterword to this Article
discusses these changes and their relevance to the Article's analysis. See infra notes 107-28 and
accompanying text.
28. See infra note 78.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 90-106.
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various methods that would correct this broad structural inconsistency and that,
if enacted, would eliminate tax incentives for leveraged buyouts as well as help
achieve a more neutral and coherent tax policy.
II. FINANCIAL STRUCTURES AND TAX CONSEQUENCES
The major consequence of a leveraged buyout occurs when the equity own-
ership of an operating corporation shifts from the public to a small investor
group, accompanied by a significant change in the corporation's capital struc-
ture.30 Before the transaction occurs, the target firm typically has a substantial
net worth or shareholder equity, with its assets burdened by relatively little debt.
After the buyout, net worth is reduced significantly, although the corporate asset
base typically remains unchanged. The reduction in net worth is caused by two
related financial events: the corporation borrows cash, incurring significant
amounts of new corporate debt, and the loan proceeds are immediately distrib-
uted to shareholders. Corporate liabilities are substantially increased, and share-
holder equity is substantially reduced. The recipients of the distribution are the
public shareholders, whose stock interests are eliminated in the transaction. The
equity interests that remain are held by an investor group, usually including
some members of the firm's management, 31 who obtained or increased their in-
terests with minimal cash contributions. Immediately after the transaction, the
corporation's cash flow, which previously was used to pay dividends or increase
shareholder equity, is used to service and repay the debt. After the debt is re-
paid, the new shareholders anticipate significant gain through appreciation in
the value of their stock.
Participants in a leveraged buyout are usually brought together by an in-
vestment banker, who benefits from substantial fees and from the opportunity to
30. Detailed discussions of the corporate and financial aspects of leveraged buyouts may be
found in Daitz, Kaufman, Ley, & Messineo, Leveraged Buy-Outs, in ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS:
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 143 (1985) [hereinafter Daitz].
If the target's stock rather than its assets is purchased, with the target then held as a subsidiary
of the acquiring corporation, the capital structure of the target itself will not change. Instead, the
capital restructuring will be reflected in the balance sheet of the acquiring corporation, whose only
asset will be the target stock. The debt of the acquiring company, incurred in order to purchase the
target stock, will be secured by the target's assets and repaid with the target's cash flow. Accord-
ingly, the financial consequences (and the restructuring of capital) are basically the same whether the
buyout is accomplished as a purchase of stock or assets. The tax consequences are also the same.
See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
3 1. In the past corporations that went private did so most frequently through the initiative of
their management, which was able to acquire a large ownership stake in the company as a result of
the transaction. One of the most significant changes in the leveraged buyout market has been the
entry of investment banking concerns that specialize in such transactions, identifying attractive tar-
get firms and then obtaining funds from a variety of outside sources. See Cuff, Buyout Firms Seek
Returns, Not Synergy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1985, at Dl, col. 3. Typically, neither the investment
banker nor the investors will have any interest in changing the operations of the firm after the
transaction. Consequently, the uninterrupted continuation of corporate management is considered
important, and managers often will be given the opportunity to participate in the equity ownership
as an incentive for remaining with the firm. See, eg., Weiss, supra note 4, at 42. Some commenta-
tors have expressed concern over the decreasing equity participation of management in more recent
transactions, providing less incentive to continue the smooth operations that are essential to the
corporation's repayment of its new debt. See, eg., Adkins, supra note 3, at 34.
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participate as an equity investor.32 The target firm will have been selected by
the investment banker on the basis of several different factors. Because of the
substantial debt to be incurred, the firm ideally will enjoy those characteristics
attractive to lenders: a stable earnings history that is not significantly affected by
business cycles, an established position in the market, and modest requirements
for future capital investment. A solid asset base, burdened with relatively little
debt, is also important, as is a strong management team. 33 An ideal target com-
pany would also be substantially discounted on the stock market-at least in the
estimation of insiders-with its market value significantly less than both the ap-
praised liquidation value of its assets and a value based on capitalization of fu-
ture profits. The gap assumed between market value and estimated real value is
an important inducement to the new equity investors, who expect that difference
to be reflected in future stock appreciation.
34
A leveraged buyout typically is accomplished through the purchase of the
stock or assets of the target firm by a corporation formed solely for the purposes
of the acquisition. Although the acquiring entity initially will be capitalized
with cash from the equity investors, its ultimate capital structure will be
designed with one primary goal: obtaining the maximum amount of debt to
finance the acquisition of the target company, with the debt to be serviced and
repaid out of the target company's future cash flow. By maximizing the debt,
the new equity investors can minimize the cash they need to obtain 100 percent
of the outstanding stock.
35
To the extent possible, loans will be obtained from banks or commercial
lending companies in the form of senior debt, to be secured by the stock or assets
of the acquired firm. These loans usually bear interest at a rate that floats sev-
eral points above prime, with the lenders sometimes also benefitting from large
front-end fees. Additional amounts, also loaned at variable rates, may often be
obtained from banks based on appraisals of future cash floWS.
3 6
32. The profits made by the investment bankers specializing in leveraged buyouts have been
widely publicized. See, eg., Ross, supra note 3; Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 41.
According to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, the $45 million fee that Kohlberg, Kravis,
Roberts & Co. will receive for arranging the leveraged buyout of Beatrice, valued at $6.2 billion, will
be "the largest single investment advisory fee on record." See Ellis, Leverage Leader, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
33. LEVERAGED BuYoUTr, supra note 4, at 27. For discussions of the characteristics of ideal
target firms that have evolved along with the popularity of leveraged buyouts, see Ferenbach,
LB.O.s: A New Capital Market (And How to Cope with It), MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONs, Fall
1983, at 21; Miller, supra note 4, at 98-99.
34. Daitz, supra note 30, at 149-50. The equity investors also hope to realize gain by increased
efficiency in operations after the leveraged buyout, resulting from several factors: increased incentive
of management once they have an ownership stake; management's freedom to concentrate on cash
flow rather than earnings per share; and elimination of certain reporting and disclosure requirements
applicable to public companies. See authorities cited supra notes 13-16.
35. See LEVERAGED BuyoUrs, supra note 4, at 12-17.
36. See LEVERAGED BuYours, supra note 4, at 12-14; Daitz, supra note 30, at 177, 179-80. In
some situations the investor group is able to negotiate an interest rate cap, providing some protection
against rising rates. See Bus. WK., supra note 9, at 72. As leveraged buyouts become larger and,
according to some sources, riskier, the traditional senior lenders are being replaced by other banks
willing to take more risks in exchange for the large front-end profits and high interest rates. See
Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 40-41.
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Even with significant undervaluation by the market, the purchase price for
the target firm typically will still exceed its maximum secured loan capacity.
"Mezzanine debt," unsecured and subordinated, will be obtained to fill in the
gap between the senior debt and the minimum equity contributions of the inves-
tors. These loans usually bear high rates of interest and frequently are accompa-
nied by an equity interest, such as a stock option or conversion right. Preferred
stock, sometimes with mandatory dividend payments and redemption rights,
also may be issued. The participants at this level, which include pension funds,
insurance companies, and venture capitalists, take greater risks and provide an
additional layer of protection for the senior lenders. As compensation, they
share with the principals the opportunity to benefit from the discounted market
valuation of the target through future equity growth.
37
As leveraged buyouts increase in number and size, different and often more
innovative financing methods are developed. Additional loans sometimes can be
obtained if the equity investors agree to sell some of the company's assets or an
entire division or subsidiary after the transaction, with executory sales contracts
providing security for these creditors.3 8 In recent transactions, additional fi-
nancing has also been obtained with less traditional instruments, referred to as
"junk bonds." These securities, which are high-yield and high-risk, fully
subordinated and protected by a minimal equity cushion, may be issued directly
to the public shareholders or may be sold by underwriters to provide a source of
funding that otherwise would not be available. 39 Employee stock ownership
plans, which offer significant tax advantages upon repayment of the debt, may
provide an additional source of financing. 4°
Once the maximum loan capacity is determined and the borrowed funds
obtained, the desired capital structure can be put into place in various ways.
4 1
37. See Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 41, 43 ("The phrase [mezzanine
money], which GE Credit coined in the late 1970s, describes money above the ground floor (the
equity investors) but below the roof (the senior lenders)."); see also LEVERAGED Buyotrrs, supra
note 4, at 14-15 (describing the function of "mezzanine" financing as bridging a gap rather than
serving as a debt or equity instrument).
38. See Daitz, supra note 30, at 158-59. The possibility of a sale of assets after the acquisition,
with the sale proceeds used to reduce the new debt, has made it easier to acquire larger corporations
in leveraged buyouts. See With a Lever Long Enough .... FORBES, June 4, 1984, at 220.
39. See Daitz, supra note 30, at 155, 178. These "junk" bonds are also frequently placed with
institutional investors. See Bianco, supra note 6, at 90-91. Concerns have been mounting over the
high risk associated with junk bonds, and the Federal Reserve Board has recently taken steps in an
attempt to curb their use. See supra note 24. Witnesses testifying at congressional hearings on the
tax aspects of hostile takeovers emphasized the dangers of the increasing use of junk bonds in hostile
acquisitions, calling for an immediate moratorium on their use while changes in the tax laws to limit
deductibility of interest on such debt are under consideration. See, eg., Senate Hearings, supra note
10, at 97-106 (statement of Nicholas F. Brady, Chairman, Dillon, Read & Co., Inc., calling the use
of junk bond financing a "dangerous destabilizing element for our national savings system"); id. at
91-94 (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici).
40. See HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 1, at 50-52; Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 760-62. The
increased use of employee stock ownership plans to provide funding for leveraged acquisitions has
raised concerns that the incentives are being used in ways not intended by Congress. See House
Hearings, supra note 17, at 209-14 (statement of Ronald A. Pearlman, Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, Department of the Treasury).
41. For a discussion of these alternative structures, see Daitz, supra note 30, at 168-75. For
detailed explanations of the tax aspects, see HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 1, at 30-45; Bowen,
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Often, the transaction will proceed as a merger between the target and the ac-
quiring corporation, with the public shareholders receiving the newly borrowed
cash in exchange for their shares. Alternatively, the target firm may transfer its
assets to the new entity in exchange for cash and then distribute the cash to its
shareholders in redemption of their stock. Sometimes, if a two-tier structure is
desired (with the operating firm to be held as a subsidiary of the acquiring cor-
poration), the acquiring entity will make a tender offer for the target stock. Any
non-tendering shareholders may be eliminated through a subsequent "clean-up"
merger of the target with a transitory subsidiary of the acquiring corporation,
giving the acquiring corporation 100 percent ownership of the target.
Whichever form the transaction takes, the public shareholders will termi-
nate their equity interests in exchange for cash, with the distributions to them
financed by the new corporate loans.4 2 The public shareholders will be treated
as if they had sold their stock, whether the stock is sold to the acquiring entity
directly or is cancelled on the merger or liquidation of the target firm.4 3 Ac-
cordingly, the shareholders will be taxed only to the extent of their gain, which
equals the excess of the amount realized over their investment in the stock. As-
suming the stock is a capital asset, tax will be computed at the preferential rate
for capital gains.44
The financial position of the operating company after the acquisition will
depend in large part on the tax provisions, with the company typically paying
much less in taxes than it had prior to the acquisition. 45 Cash flow from opera-
tions will, of course, be used to service and repay the debt. In the years immedi-
Structuring Leveraged Buyouts--Selected Tax Problems, 63 TAXES 935 (1985); Davis, Leveraged
Buyouts Selected Issues Pre- and Post-TEFRA, 41 N.Y.U. TAX INST. §§ 8.01-.05 (1983).
42. The price paid to the public shareholders for their stock typically will be at a premium over
the current market value. See Daitz, supra note 30, at 155; Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 737-39. For
an empirical study of the effect of leveraged buyouts on the wealth of public shareholders, see De-
Angelo, DeAngelo & Rice, Going Private Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. &
ECON. 367 (1984).
43. See, eg., Levin, supra note 23, at 120-21. Depending on the form of the transaction, the
public shareholders may also be treated as if their stock was redeemed by the target firm. This
characterization results from disregarding the transitory acquiring corporation if, for example, that
corporation merges into the target to accomplish the buyout. See Rev. Rul. 78-250, 1978-1 C.B. 83.
In this case the public shareholders will be entitled to sale or exchange treatment under I.R.C.
§ 302(b)(3) (1985), which governs complete terminations of interest. As long as the public share-
holders' interests are completely eliminated, their tax consequences should be straightforward. Is-
sues may arise for shareholders of the target firm, such as members of the management team, who
retain or increase their percentage interests in the corporation while also receiving cash. In some
cases the cash may be treated as a dividend to them. For complete discussions of these and other tax
issues, see Bowen, supra note 41; Davis, supra note 41.
44. Proceeds from the sale or redemption of stock held for more than six months generally are
treated as long term capital gains. See I.R.C. §§ 1221-1222 (1985). The lower tax rate on capital
gains has arisen, in the case of individuals, under I.R.C. § 1202 (1985) (allowing a deduction of 60%
of net capital gain) and, in the case of corporations, under I.R.C. § 1201 (1985) (providing a maxi-
mum rate of 28% on net capital gain). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, signed by President Reagan on
October 22, 1986, made significant changes in the taxation of capital gains. The Afterword to this
Article discusses these changes and their relevance to the Article's analysis. See infra notes 107-28
and accompanying text.
45. For comparisons of the tax positions of specific firms (both real and hypothetical) after a
leveraged buyout, see LEVERAGED BuyouTs, supra note 4, at 16-21; Canellos, supra note 21, at 100-
09; Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 743-48; Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, supra note 3, at 42.
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ately after the acquisition, the corporation will have substantial tax deductions
for interest payments, 46 whereas previously those amounts were used to pay
nondeductible dividends or to increase corporate accumulations out of which
future nondeductible shareholder distributions could be made. These tax conse-
quences will not change if the target firm is operated as a subsidiary, with its
parent, the newly formed corporation, repaying the loans with dividends re-
ceived from the operating company. Such distributions will not be taxed to the
parent corporation, 4 7 and the interest deductions of the parent will offset the
operating company's business income on a consolidated tax return.
48
Higher depreciation deductions, resulting from increased bases in assets af-
ter the acquisition, may also be available to the target firm after the buyout. If
assets are acquired, the bases in the assets will automatically reflect the purchase
price. 49 If stock is acquired, an election may be made to reach the same result.50
In either case, however, the step-up in bases will be obtained only at the cost of
recapturing and including in income prior tax benefits, such as previous depreci-
ation deductions. 5 1 Whether the present value of the increase in future deprecia-
46. It is possible, although unlikely, that interest deductions (generally permitted under I.R.C.
§ 163 (1985)) would be disallowed by I.R.C. § 279 (1985). That section operates to restrict deduc-
tions for interest paid on corporate debt (in excess of $5 million per year) if it arises from specified
types of "corporate acquisition indebtedness." Id. Section 279 will apply only if the following con-
ditions are present: (1) the debt is issued as consideration for stock, or two-thirds of the assets, of
another corporation; (2) the debt is subordinated to claims of trade creditors or any other substantial
amount of unsecured debt; (3) the debt is convertible into stock of the acquiring corporation or is
issued as part of an investment unit that includes an option to acquire such stock; and (4) on the last
day of the acquiring corporation's taxable year in which it issued the debt, the debt to equity ratio of
the corporation exceeds 2 to 1, or the corporation's projected earnings do not exceed 3 times the
annual interest to be paid or incurred. Id.
Section 279 was enacted in 1969 in an attempt to eliminate "a special and unwarranted induce-
ment to merger." See Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 320-21 (statement of James S. Eustice,
Professor, New York University Law School, discussing the reasons behind the enactment of § 279).
Because the statute contains four specific conditions, all of which must be satisfied, it is regarded as
relatively easy to avoid in the leveraged buyout context. See Canellos, supra note 21, at 111-12.
47. As long as the acquiring corporation holds at least 80% of the voting stock and at least
80% of the value of the stock of the target corporation, it will be entitled to deduct 100% of the
dividends received. I.R.C. §§ 243(a), (b), 1504(a)(2) (1985).
48. The corporations will be able to file a consolidated return as long as the acquiring corpora-
tion owns at least 80% of the voting stock and at least 80% of the total value of the target corpora-
tion's stock. See id. §§ 1501, 1504 (1985).
49. If the transaction is treated as a taxable purchase of assets, the acquiring corporation will
take a cost basis in the assets under id. § 1012 (1985). This result could be changed if the former
shareholders of the target firm end up with a significant percentage of the stock in the acquiring
corporation. In this case, the transaction could be treated as a reorganization, requiring a carryover
basis in assets. For a discussion of this possibility in the context of various examples, see Bowen,
supra note 41, at 943-48; Levin, supra note 23, at 149-51.
50. The election is allowed under I.R.C. § 338 (1985), but only if certain conditions are met,
including the requirement that the acquiring corporation has purchased 80% of the target stock
within a 12-month period. Id. § 338(d)(3). Whether this requirement is met will depend on the
form of the transaction. For discussions of issues that may arise on the question of the availability of
the election under § 338, see Bowen, supra note 41, at 938-41; Levin, supra note 23, at 131-39.
51. If a corporation sells its assets and then liquidates, its tax consequences will be governed by
I.R.C. §§ 336, 337 (1985). Under those provisions, the corporation generally will not recognize the
gain or loss on the sale or distribution of assets. The depreciation recapture provisions are only one
of several significant exceptions to this rule of nonrecognition. Other exceptions include investment
tax credit recapture and ordinary income recognized on certain LIFO inventory reserves. See Hos-
TILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 1, at 30-33. The same tax consequences will follow if the acquiring
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tion deductions will be greater than the immediate tax cost of the recapture will
depend on the nature and value of the assets acquired.
52
III. THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR SHAREHOLDERS
The major tax consequences of a leveraged buyout involve the public share-
holders, who are taxed on gain realized from their stock dispositions at the capi-
tal gains rate,5 3 and the target corporation, which will be paying deductible
interest after the buyout instead of paying nondeductible dividends or accumu-
lating amounts for future distribution to shareholders.54 A comparison of these
tax consequences to the basic structural elements of the taxation of corporations
and their shareholders exposes a serious theoretical inconsistency.
The taxation of corporations and their shareholders is governed by several
basic principles. A fundamental concept is that a corporation is a separate tax-
paying entity.5 5 A corporation is thus subject to tax on its income, which may
be defined as amounts realized by the entity over and above the after-tax capital
contributions of its shareholders. 56 In line with this definition of entity gain, a
corporation purchases stock of the target firm and makes an election under § 338 so that the asset
bases reflect the stock purchase price. The target corporation will be deemed to have sold its assets
and then liquidated. It will be required to file a final tax return and report gain or loss that is not
protected by § 337, such as depreciation recapture. See id. at 33-35. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
made significant changes in these provisions. See infra note 115.
52. Despite the offsetting cost of recapture of previous depreciation deductions, the value of the
step-up in basis may be significant. The benefit results because, although the recapture provisions
include in income an amount equal to previous depreciation deductions, the basis step-up (on which
future depreciation is based) will reflect fair market value. Accordingly, any increase in basis over
original cost is obtained without tax liability. The benefits are magnified by the ability to depreciate
assets at accelerated rates. Some practitioners have attempted to increase this benefit even more,
arguing that a premium included in the purchase price for stock or assets could be allocated among
the acquired assets, increasing their depreciable or amortizable bases to amounts in excess of their
individual fair market values, instead of allocated to the nonamortizable asset, goodwill. See, eg.,
Bane One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 476, 502-09 (1985), in which the Tax Court rejected the
taxpayer's allocations. The Treasury has recently acted to end this practice in the context of stock
acquisitions. Temporary regulations published under § 338 now provide that the stepped-up basis in
assets acquired shall not exceed their fair market values on the acquisition date, with any excess
residual value allocated to goodwill or going concern value. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986).
The so-called "General Utilities" rule, which allows the nonrecognition of gain on a liquidation
sale or distribution, has been widely criticized. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, REPORT ON
H.R. 3838, H.R. Doe. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 281-82 (1985). Under the tax bill passed by
the House of Representatives, that rule would be changed so that, with limited exceptions, all gain or
loss on assets sold or distributed would be recognized. H.R. Rep. No. 3838, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.,
§§ 331, 332 (1985). Under this proposal the cost of the basis step-up in a leveraged buyout would be
substantially increased.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included these changes to the "General Utilities" rule. See infra
note 115.
53. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the preferential capital gains rate. For an analysis
of the effects of this change, see infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
54. As mentioned previously in the text, the target may also enjoy higher depreciation deduc-
tions after the acquisition. The future benefits, however, will be offset by the immediate tax cost of
depreciation recapture. See supra note 52.
55. See Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C, An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Re-
form, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 97 (1977) (discussing the decision by Congress in 1909 to impose a separate
corporate tax "apparently without a principled assessment of the wisdom of such a move").
56. See Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in Exchange: Challenging the
1987] 1051
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
corporation is not allowed a tax deduction for distributions to its shareholders.5 7
Corporate income by definition represents gain to the shareholders, and a
"double tax" results because they, in addition to the corporation, are taxed on
this gain.5 8 The timing of the shareholders' tax does not, however, depend on
accrual or realization of income at the entity level. Although corporate gain will
cause appreciation in the shareholders' stock, appreciation alone will not trigger
tax consequences to them.59 They will pay tax on the gain only when it is real-
ized by them, either upon stock sales or corporate distributions.6 If the share-
holders do not transfer stock, their full tax burden, computed at ordinary rates,
Congressional Solution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 TEx. L. REv. 89, 107-20 (1984). Support for this
definition of corporate income is found in the provisions that determine a corporation's basis in
property received from its shareholders. When a corporation receives property from a shareholder,
either in exchange for stock or as a capital contribution, the corporation will take a basis in the
property that is generally equal to the shareholder's after-tax investment in the property. The corpo-
ration will exclude the value of the property from income under I.R.C. § 1032 (1985) and, if the
transaction is taxable to the shareholder, the corporation will take a basis in the property equal to
the fair market value of the stock. See Treas. Reg. 1.1032-1(a) (1985). Assuming that the values of
the property and the stock are equal, the corporation's permanent exclusion (measured by its basis in
the property) will equal the shareholder's after-tax capital investment. If the transaction is tax-free
to the shareholder, so that the shareholder does not recognize inherent gain or loss on the transfer,
the corporation will still be entitled to exclude the full value of the property from income on receipt
under § 1032. In this case, however, the corporation's permanent exclusion, reflected by its basis in
the property, will be derived from the shareholder's capital investment in the property under I.R.C.
§ 362(a) (1985). The shareholder will take that same amount as his or her basis in the stock under
id. § 358. As a result of these provisions, income that accrues to the corporate entity over and above
the excludable amount of corporate capital will necessarily be gain to its shareholders over and
above their aggregate after-tax capital investments.
57. But see H.R. Rep. No. 3838, supra note 52, § 311 (provision would allow corporations a
deduction for 10% of dividends paid out of previously taxed corporate income). Accompanying
changes would ensure the imposition of some tax on such amounts when the recipients are tax-
exempt or foreign shareholders. See id.
58. The double tax system has been criticized, and proposals to integrate the individual and
corporate tax structures have gained strong support. See eg., McLure, Integration of the Personal
and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 532, 549-74 (1975) (discussing alternative integration proposals). Many of the structural in-
consistencies under current law, including the one discussed in this Article in the context of lever-
aged buyouts, could be eliminated by adopting some form of integration. See Warren, The Relation
and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REv. 719 (1981).
59. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920).
60. These two modes of realization have quite different effects on how the gain is taxed to the
individual shareholder. On a sale of stock, a shareholder will be taxed only to the extent the amount
realized exceeds his or her basis in the stock and then typically at the preferential capital gains rate.
On a corporate distribution, a shareholder will be taxed on the full amount received at ordinary rates
if the corporation has sufficient earnings and profits. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316 (1985). A distri-
bution out of corporate earnings and profits will be taxed at ordinary rates even to a new shareholder
who has paid a price for stock that includes the distributed amount, so that the distribution does not
represent a gain on the shareholder's investment. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
The result of this rule appears to be double taxation to the shareholder group on corporate profits,
because the seller has already paid tax on that amount as capital gain. The gain, however, is bal-
anced by the capital loss that is inherent in the stock held by the new shareholder to the extent that
corporate profits included in the shareholder's cost were distributed to him or her as dividends and
taxed as ordinary income. Accordingly, the net result to the shareholder group is only one tax on
the corporate profits at the shareholder level, with that tax computed at ordinary rates to the extent
of the dividend distributions. Although most withdrawals of corporate profits are taxed at ordinary
rates, exceptions are made for certain transactions that are treated as dispositions of stock, including
certain redemptions under I.R.C. § 302(a) (1985) and liquidation distributions under id. § 331(a).
See Clark, supra note 55, at 100-17 (detailed analysis of the history and consequences of these provi-
sions); see also infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text (discussing the changes brought about by
the 1986 Tax Reform Act and their impact on this Article's analysis).
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will be deferred as long as the funds are retained by the entity. 61
Because of the potential deferral of shareholder tax, it initially may appear
that these rules create a bias away from corporate distributions of earnings and
toward corporate retention. However, the tax provisions actually operate in a
more neutral fashion, achieving a rough equivalence between corporate retention
and distribution.
62
When a corporation retains, rather than distributes, its earnings, the defer-
ral of shareholder tax is accompanied by a cost that roughly compensates for the
benefit of the deferral. Retained funds generate profits that are subject to corpo-
rate tax, a burden that would have been avoided if the funds had been distrib-
uted and invested by the shareholders outside of the corporate entity. The
system contemplates that the cost of the corporate tax on the yield will continue
as long as the shareholders enjoy the benefit of the deferral, that is, until the
funds are distributed and the shareholder tax imposed. Assuming no change in
the shareholder tax rate, so that corporate retentions and accumulated yield are
eventually taxed to shareholders at the same rate that would have applied to an
earlier distribution, any benefit from the deferral will have been reduced
significantly.
The benefits and costs of corporate retention compensate for each other
exactly if all shareholder and corporate tax rates are equivalent, and if share-
holders and the corporation can invest in assets earning equivalent rates of re-
turn. 63 The resulting equivalence between corporate retention and distribution
61. An exception occurs in the case of certain stock dividends that generate a shareholder tax at
ordinary rates on undistributed corporate profits. See I.R.C. § 305(b) (1985). For criticisms of this
departure from the distinction between retained and distributed corporate earnings, see Cohen, Tax-
ing Stock Dividends and Economic Theory, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 142 (1975); Stone, Back to Funda-
mentals: Another Version of the Stock Dividend Saga, 79 COLUM. L. Rv. 898 (1979). Other
exceptions occur in the case of corporate distributions that are taxed to shareholders as sales, such as
certain redemptions under I.R.C. § 302 (1985) and liquidations under § 331. In these cases the
distributed funds will escape tax at ordinary rates altogether. The recipient shareholder will be taxed
at capital gains rate to the extent the amount realized exceeds the stock basis; the shareholder's basis
(used as an offset to determine the amount of gain) will reflect amounts previously taxed to other
shareholders on sales, typically at the capital gains rate. The incentive that results from extending
the preferential treatment to certain forms of distribution is the subject of this Article, which focuses
on the incentive in the context of leveraged buyouts. Under the reform possibilities discussed infra
text accompanying notes 90-106, this preferential treatment would be eliminated. See also infra
notes 107-28 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in capital gains treatment under the
1986 Tax Reform Act and their impact on this Article's analysis).
62. The compensatory relationship between the individual and corporate taxes was described in
the early 1970s by an economist who sought to explain
empirical studies of the effects of taxation on corporate finance [which] suggest that taxa-
tion has not had a very significant effect on corporate financial structure, let alone the
dramatic changes that one might have anticipated given the very large increases in the
corporate tax rates in the last fifty years.
Stiglitz, supra note 25, at 1. This relationship is also extensively described and analyzed in AMER.
LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25.
63. This conclusion and the example that follows it in the text ignore the shareholder capital
gains tax that may be imposed on retained corporate profits when a shareholder sells stock. In the
example in the text, the shareholders are presumed to be enjoying a complete deferral of tax on
earnings retained by the corporation, a benefit fully paid for by the imposition of corporate tax on
the yield. In reality, that deferral may not be complete, because retained earnings will be taxed on
sales to the extent reflected in stock appreciation. Considering aggregate shareholder wealth, the
capital gains tax imposed on stock sales would appear to provide an incentive against corporate
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may be illustrated by a numerical example. Assume that a shareholder group
forms a new corporation, capitalizing it with 10,000 dollars. For purposes of
this example, assume also that all shareholders and the corporation are subject
to tax at the same fifty percent rate and that all shareholders and the corporation
could invest funds at a pre-tax rate of return of ten percent. 64
Each year, the corporation will earn 1000 dollars and, after paying tax, will
have 500 dollars to distribute to its shareholders or to retain. Distribution will
trigger immediate shareholder tax, but the future yield from the after-tax funds
will be received directly by the shareholders and so will escape corporate tax.
Retention will defer tax at the shareholder level, but the future yield from the
retained funds will be subject to corporate tax in addition to the eventual share-
holder tax imposed on distribution. Under the assumed conditions, the costs of
either choice will exactly offset the benefits, and the shareholder group will be
indifferent concerning the corporation's decision to retain or distribute its an-
nual earnings.
If the corporation distributes its 500 dollars in earnings, the shareholder
group, paying tax at the fifty percent rate, will have 250 dollars to reinvest at
their individual rates of return. If the corporation made annual 500 dollar dis-
tributions for a ten-year period, with continual shareholder reinvestment at a ten
percent rate of return, the shareholder group would have accumulated after-tax
gain of 3144 dollars at the end of ten years.
The corporation could instead retain and reinvest its annual earnings of 500
dollars for the same ten-year period, with all of its yield subject to corporate tax.
In this case, assuming continual corporate reinvestment, the corporation will
have accumulated 6288 dollars, exactly twice as much as the shareholders were
retention: the corporate tax will continue to be imposed on the yield from the retained funds despite
the new after-tax investment of the purchaser. The purchaser may recoup part of the investment as
a capital loss if he or she is subsequently taxed at ordinary rates on dividend distributions that were
included as part of the purchase price for the stock. The net effect is one tax at ordinary rates to the
shareholder group, with the capital loss of the dividend recipient balancing the prior capital gain of
the seller. The shareholder group, however, suffers a detriment from the imposition of the capital
gains tax prior to distribution of the funds. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note
25, at 439; Warren, supra note 58, at 726-29.
The adverse consequences of the imposition of capital gains tax on a sale are considerably less-
ened because of the possibility that future distributions will be treated to the shareholders as sales.
On such a distribution, the shareholder will use his or her entire basis as an offset to the amount
realized in computing gain. To the extent that basis reflects gain taxed to other shareholders on
sales, the capital gains tax imposed on those sales will become the permanent tax rate imposed on
that amount of corporate earnings. If the basis of the recipient shareholder has been stepped-up
because of death under I.R.C. § 1014 (1985), a significant amount of corporate earnings can be
distributed to shareholders free of any tax burden whatsoever.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made significant changes in the tax treatment of capital gains.
The Afterword to this Article discusses these changes and their impact on the Article's analysis. See
infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
64. In this example, the investor will earn a 2.5% after-tax return on the investment in corpo-
rate stock, while an investment in an asset other than corporate stock would have yielded the same
investor a return of 5%. This difference, which arises solely from the imposition of the double tax,
may well cause investors to prefer noncorporate over corporate investments. The resulting shift in
capital eventually could have an equilibriating effect on the rate of return, with the yield on corpo-
rate and noncorporate investments becoming more nearly equivalent. See Warren, supra note 58, at
725-26. The example does not consider the situation after such a potential market adjustment.
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able to accumulate on their own. The excess, however, is eliminated on distribu-
tion, because, at that point, the shareholders will pay a fifty percent tax on the
full accumulation. Accordingly, at the end of ten years, the shareholders will
have the same amount, 3144 dollars, in after-tax funds as they would have had if
the corporation had made periodic distributions. Because of the imposition of
corporate tax on yield from the retained funds during the period of retention, the
corporate accumulation has been effectively limited so that the deferral benefit
disappears on distribution.65 As long as the same tax rate applies whenever the
retained funds are distributed to shareholders, whether annually or at the end of
the ten-year period, retention by the corporation will be equivalent to distribu-
tion, with shareholder wealth unaffected by the corporation's decision.
6
Under this model, which achieves equivalence between corporate distribu-
tion and retention, corporate tax on yield from retained earnings is required as
long as shareholders enjoy the benefit of deferral of the tax that would have been
imposed if the funds had been distributed. A single tax on yield at the share-
holder level is permitted once the funds have been distributed and the share-
holder tax imposed. The tax consequences that have followed from leveraged
buyouts must be compared to this model.
65. See Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1113, 1123-1126 (1974) (explaining the principle that the value of a tax deferral is equal to a tax
exemption on the income that the taxpayer would have earned if he or she had not enjoyed the
deferral, but had instead invested the after-tax amount). In the example in the text, the benefit of
that deferral is exactly offset by annual imposition of the corporate tax, because that rate is assumed
to equal the shareholder's individual rate.
66. Differences in shareholder and corporate tax rates will, of course, create biases toward cor-
porate retention or distribution. If the shareholder rate is lower, a bias is created toward distribu-
tion, while a lower corporate rate creates a bias toward retention. If, for example, the corporate tax
on the yield is imposed at 30%, while the shareholder would have paid 50% tax on the distribution,
the corporate tax does not fully compensate for the value of the deferral. Using the example dis-
cussed in the text with these changes in rates, the corporation would have accumulated $9671 by
reinvesting its earnings from the initial $10,000 contribution for 10 years. The shareholders would
have had $4835 after paying tax on the final distribution, rather than the $3144 they would have
accumulated individually if annual distributions had been made.
The difference in rates between corporations and shareholders has been considered as a signifi-
cant influence on corporate financing decisions in the context of closely held firms. Not only are
those corporations often subject to the lower, graduated corporate tax rates, but they frequently are
controlled by a few shareholders who can determine the firm's distribution policies with their own
tax positions firmly in mind. In an attempt to neutralize the impact of tax considerations on such a
firm's decision to retain earnings, Congress enacted a penalty tax on "unnecessary accumulations,"
funds retained for the purpose of avoiding individual tax. See I.R.C. §§ 531, 532 (1985). Thus, the
benefit of the deferral that may result from the low corporate tax rate is not eliminated, but is limited
to retained funds actually needed for legitimate business purposes.
Differences in shareholder and corporate tax rates will exert less influence in the context of a
publicly held corporation. With a large, varied, and constantly changing shareholder group, a public
corporation is less likely to retain earnings on the basis of the marginal rates of its investors. If
retention were motivated by the requisite tax avoidance purpose, the accumulated earnings tax could
be applied to a public corporation. See id. § 532(c). A more effective limitation on unnecessary
accumulations may come from the public shareholders themselves. In contrast to most shareholders
of closely held firms, public shareholders appear to value a steady stream of current distributions
despite the deferral benefit accompanying corporate retention. See Brudney, Dividends, Discretion,
and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85, 90-91 (1980); Cohen, supra note 61, at 154.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made significant changes in individual and corporate tax rates.
The Afterword to this Article discusses these changes and their relevance to the Article's analysis.
See infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
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In a leveraged buyout, retained earnings are distributed to shareholders,
triggering shareholder tax consequences and freeing the funds from the burden
of future corporate tax. The distribution is financed with newly incurred corpo-
rate debt. Prior to the transaction, the yield on the retained earnings was subject
to corporate tax, in addition to eventual shareholder tax on distribution. After
the transaction, the yield on the principal of the debt is tax-deductible to the
corporation, subject to a single tax when received by the creditor.67
The tax consequences as just described are perfectly consistent with the
theoretical model. The benefit of deferral of the shareholder tax on retained
earnings is eliminated by imposition of the corporate tax on yield during the
period of retention. When the earnings are distributed, so that shareholders are
taxed and the deferral ended, the corporate tax is eliminated on subsequent yield
earned outside of the corporate entity. The analysis is not affected by the fact
that, in the case of a leveraged buyout, the corporation borrows money simulta-
neously with its distribution of retained earnings to shareholders. Regardless of
whether the borrowing is from the former shareholders or from new third-party
creditors, the subsequent corporate interest deduction, allowing the yield on the
debt principal to escape corporate tax, is consistent with the model. The model
requires the compensating cost of corporate tax on the yield only if the funds are
enjoying the benefit of deferral at the investor level, a benefit that extends to
retained earnings but not to funds contributed in the form of debt.6 8
67. This result is more obvious when the acquiring corporation purchases assets of the target
corporation, with the sale followed by the target's complete liquidation. In this case, the acquiring
corporation will continue the targets operations directly after the acquisition. The main difference
between the target as it had previously existed and the acquiring corporation after the acquisition
will be the substitution of debt for retained earnings and the new deduction for distributed yield.
The same effect is achieved when the acquiring corporation purchases the target's stock from indi-
vidual shareholders and retains the target as a separate subsidiary. Because of the dividends-received
deduction of I.R.C. § 243 (1985) and the consolidated return provisions of id. §§ 1501-1563, distri-
butions from the target can be used to pay the acquiring corporation's interest obligations, and the
tax consequences will be the same as if the two corporations had been combined into one entity.
68. The interest deduction that is allowed on corporate debt results in a rough equivalence
between a corporation's choices of financing an investment by retained earnings or by debt. Assume,
for example, that a corporation is about to invest in a $40,000 project that will have a 10% before-
tax rate of return. Investors in the project also expect a 10% rate of return, whether the investors
are new creditors or current shareholders who will invest by foregoing dividends and allowing the
corporation to retain its earnings. Both the corporation and the investors are subject to tax at the
rate of 50%.
Under these conditions a corporation can borrow $40,000 and, because of the corporate interest
deduction, its yield on the project will exactly cover the cost of the capital. The corporation will
distribute its entire before-tax yield of $4000 to investors, giving them their required 10% rate of
return. The same result is true if the corporation finances the project with $40,000 of retained earn-
ings. The corporation will still earn $4000 but, after corporate tax, will have only $2000 to distribute
to its shareholders. In this case, however, the $2000 is sufficient to meet the 10% required yield of
the investors. Although the corporation used $40,000 of retained earnings, the cost of the financing
to the shareholders is $20,000-the after-tax amount they gave up by foregoing a dividend distribu-
tion of $40,000. Accordingly, a distribution of $2000 yields them their required 10% pre-tax rate of
return. Under these conditions, the corporation can earn the required return for its investors by
using either debt or retained earnings, making its choice of financing irrelevant. See AMER. LAW
INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 351-52; Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capi-
tal and Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1057, 1060-62 (1984).
The current system does discriminate against a corporation's choice to obtain financing by issu-
ing new equity. The yield on new equity will be subject to corporate tax, just as retained earnings,
although the new equity will not be enjoying the same deferral of individual tax. See AMER. LAW
1056 [Vol. 65
LEVERA GED B UYO UTS
The major inconsistency between leveraged buyouts and the theoretical
model arises from the shareholder tax rate that applies to the corporate distribu-
tion of the retained earnings. 69 The model assumes that the eventual distribu-
tion of corporate retained earnings and accumulated yield will be taxed to the
shareholders at the same rate that would have applied to a current distribution
of the retained amount. As long as this equivalence is maintained, the corporate
tax imposed on the yield prior to distribution will compensate for the deferral
benefit, with escape from the corporate tax justified only when that deferral ben-
efit ends and the full shareholder tax is imposed.
In a leveraged buyout, however, the shareholder tax imposed on the distri-
bution of the funds is at a preferential rate.70 The corporate tax on future yield
is called off, despite the fact the shareholders have not paid the normal price for
their withdrawal. In this case, the value of the future benefit obtained from the
distribution, reducing the tax on the yield to a single level, will outweigh the
shareholder cost of immediate tax. By lowering the cost of withdrawal, the pref-
erential rate thus creates a strong incentive toward corporate distribution of re-
tained earnings for reinvestment in assets yielding a rate of return that will not
be taxed at the corporate level.
This analysis of leveraged buyouts may be illustrated by returning to the
initial example. If a corporation has accumulated its earnings, it presumably
will distribute those funds if it can maximize the return to its investors by doing
so. The same motivation exists for a corporation to borrow money in order to
accelerate a distribution to shareholders. Incurring debt involves no extra tax
cost to the corporation, because the yield earned on the debt is payable as inter-
est and tax-deductible. Accordingly, the decision to distribute depends in either
case on whether the shareholder benefit from the distribution outweighs its cost.
The example demonstrates that the corporation will always benefit its investors
by distributing retained earnings and incurring new debt, as long as the share-
holder withdrawal can be accomplished at the capital gains rate.
7 1
In the previous example, assuming equivalent fifty percent tax rates for
both the corporation and its shareholders and equivalent ten percent rates of
return, a corporation with an initial capital contribution of 10,000 dollars was
able to accumulate 6288 dollars in ten years. Under the assumed conditions, the
corporation would not, at that point, have a tax incentive to distribute those
funds whether the shareholders were to invest the net amount available to them
in corporate debt or in any other asset free of the burden of corporate tax. On
INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 356-66 (summarizing a proposal to eliminate this bias
by allowing a corporate deduction for dividends paid up to a specified percentage of newly contrib-
uted capital).
69. A theoretical inconsistency also exists to the extent that bases in the target's assets are
stepped-up without requiring an accompanying inclusion in income. Because of the depreciation
recapture rules, this benefit is limited. See supra note 52. It has been eliminated completely by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. See infra note 115.
70. Capital gains are no longer subject to preferential treatment. For a discussion of the impact
of this change on this Article's analysis, see infra notes 107-28.
71. See Stiglitz, supra note 25, at 32 (explaining that the determination of a firm's optimal ratio
of debt to retained earnings depends on the differential between corporate and individual tax rates).
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distribution and payment of their fifty percent tax, the shareholders would have
3144 dollars to invest. If they continually reinvested their yield from that
amount, they would accumulate after-tax funds of 5121 dollars in another ten
years. They would be in precisely the same position if the corporation had re-
tained the 6288 dollars, continuing the shareholder deferral, but paying corpo-
rate tax on the yield. At the end of ten years, the corporation would have
accumulated 10,242 dollars which, after imposition of the fifty percent tax to the
shareholders upon distribution, would give them the same net amount of 5121
dollars.
This conclusion changes dramatically if, at the end of the first 10 years, the
shareholders can withdraw the 6288 dollars in accumulated earnings at the capi-
tal gains rate. Assuming a capital gains rate of twenty percent,72 the sharehold-
ers would then have 5030 dollars in after-tax funds, which they could invest in
corporate debt or in any other asset with yield taxed only at the individual level.
In this case, the immediate shareholder tax cost clearly would be worth the fu-
ture benefit to be gained from removing the corporate tax on subsequent yield,
regardless of any corporate borrowing that might be necessary to finance the
distribution. Assuming that the shareholders reinvested the full amount in as-
sets yielding ten percent interest, the shareholders would have accumulated 8193
dollars after another 10 years, a significant increase over the 5121 dollars they
would have accumulated by extending their deferral through corporate retention
for that period.
73
As the example shows, the distribution of retained earnings and the incur-
rence of equivalent amounts of debt is of no benefit to corporate investors as long
as the corporate interest deduction is obtained only at the cost of a shareholder
withdrawal that is taxed at ordinary shareholder rates. The benefit of the capital
restructuring arises from the ability to withdraw funds at the lower, capital gains
rate. In that case, the investor benefit from escaping future corporate tax will
outweigh the accompanying cost, creating a strong incentive toward withdrawal
72. Under I.R.C. § 1202 (1985), an individual taxpayer is allowed a deduction for 60% of net
capital gain. Because 40% of net capital gain is thus subject to tax, a 50% tax rate results in a tax on
capital gains of 20%.
As noted previously, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made significant changes in the tax treatment
of capital gains. The Afterword to this Article discusses these changes and their impact on the
Article's analysis. See infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
73. The bias that is created by the capital gains rate toward corporate financing by debt instead
of by retained earnings can be illustrated in a slightly different way by returning to the illustration
discussed supra note 68. In that example, assuming equivalent 50% tax rates, the corporation could
finance its investment with either debt or retained earnings and earn the same 10% yield for its
investors in either case. If, however, the shareholders can withdraw the retained earnings at a capi-
tal gains rate, the corporation will always prefer debt financing. By investing in an asset yielding
10%, the corporation could give its investors a 10% rate of return by financing the investment with
debt. The corporation could earn only a 6% return for investors by financing the investment with
retained earnings that could otherwise be withdrawn by shareholders at the capital gains rate. The
shareholder cost of the investment would be $32,000 (assuming a 20% tax on capital gains instead of
the 50% tax on ordinary income). After the corporation paid the tax on its earnings, it would
distribute $2000, giving shareholders a yield of 6%. Under these circumstances, the corporation will
benefit its shareholders by distributing the $40,000 retained earnings and financing its investment by
borrowing. See also infra notes 107-28 (discussing the changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986
and their relevance to this Article's analysis).
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of funds even if, as in a leveraged buyout, debt must be simultaneously incurred
to finance the withdrawal.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The main goal of this Article has been to illustrate that the currently ac-
cepted tax consequences of leveraged buyouts depart from the theoretical model
and thus provide a tax incentive for these transactions that is independent of
their economic or financial motivations. The source of the inconsistency arises
from the imposition of the capital gains tax on the shareholder withdrawals of
corporate accumulations, with the preferential rate providing a strong incentive
toward distribution.
This analysis conflicts with the suggestion that the primary incentive for
leveraged buyouts, and thus the most appropriate focus for reform, is the corpo-
rate interest deduction available to the target firm after the transaction. New
limitations on the deductibility of interest have been proposed, 74 and bills have
been introduced in Congress that would, among other things, disallow interest
deductions on debt incurred in specifically defined "hostile" takeovers.75 These
proposals, however, raise serious questions of tax policy.
Disallowing or limiting the interest deduction on debt issued only in certain
types of acquisitions would seem to be incompatible with the structure of the tax
code. The statute concedes a difference in tax consequences between fixed pay-
ments to outside creditors, which are deductible, and distributions to sharehold-
ers, which are not. The model achieves tax neutrality while accepting that
distinction. Clearly, the distinction requires that a line be drawn between debt
and equity. Relevant factors have been identified to protect substance over
form, preventing shareholders from treating as a loan a contribution that in sub-
stance has all of the features traditionally associated with equity.
76
The traditional standards, however, provide little or no support for
recharacterizing as equity the debt that is typically incurred in a leveraged
buyout. That debt typically is held by outside creditors rather than shareholders
and it often lacks any of the characteristics associated with stock.7 7 Disallow-
ance of the interest deduction on this type of debt would not be based on an
argument that the substance of a contribution should control the tax conse-
74. See, e.g., Canellos, supra note 21, at 115-16 (suggesting a new provision to deny interest
deductions on debt incurred in connection with the acquisition of a controlling interest in a corpora-
tion if the debt-equity ratio exceeds prevailing industry norms).
75. See supra note 21.
76. See Levin, supra note 23, at 176.
77. See Bowen, supra note 41, at 935-36. The final regulations issued under I.R.C. § 385
(1985), which were subsequently withdrawn by the Treasury, would not have treated straight debt
(debt without equity features) as stock unless the debt was held proportionately with the issuer's
stock. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.385-2(B)(1) (1983). Even if the debt had equity features, it would not be
treated as stock unless the value of the equity features exceeded the value of the debt features. See id.
§ 1.385-5(a). It has been argued, however, that "junk bonds," high-yield securities which are some-
times used to finance hostile buyouts, have equity characteristics because of the high risks associated
with them. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 313-21 (statement of James S. Eustice,
Professor, New York University Law School).
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quences regardless of its form. Instead, the disallowance, which would appear
inconsistent with the accepted distinction between debt and equity, would have
to be justified on some ground other than tax neutrality.
Increasing the cost of the shareholder withdrawal would eliminate tax in-
centives for leveraged buyouts without sacrificing tax neutrality. This reform
would provide consistency in the tax consequences of distributions to sharehold-
ers, bringing them into line with the theoretical model. Such a reform would
seem far more appropriate than a proposal to revise the accepted tax treatment
of payments to creditors in order to regulate specific transactions, a course of
action that could have unintended and undesirable consequences.
The reform suggested by this analysis would affect other transactions in
addition to leveraged buyouts. The inconsistency identified in the leveraged
buyout context is clearly not unique to that transaction, but exists whenever
shareholders are taxed on withdrawals of corporate accumulations at preferen-
tial rates. Certain liquidating distributions and distributions in redemptions that
effect a meaningful reduction in ownership, including virtually any redemption
from a minority shareholder, are all taxed to shareholders as dispositions of
stock7s and thus are inconsistent with the theoretical model described in this
Article. The tax provisions could be said, in each case, to provide a strong in-
centive for shareholder withdrawal over corporate retention.
The consequences of these tax incentives have been recognized more fully in
the context of closely held corporations, when the shareholders withdrawing the
funds are typically also in control of the corporate entity. Their ability to struc-
ture a distribution primarily for their own tax advantage has been viewed as a
significant source of abuse.79 In some cases, the relevant statutory provisions
have been amended to inhibit such abuse. In the case of redemptions, for exam-
ple, a controlling shareholder must relinquish effective control of the entity
before withdrawal of corporate accumulations will be taxed at the preferential
78. If the liquidation distribution is in complete liquidation and goes to a shareholder other
than an 80% corporate shareholder, it will be treated as an amount received in exchange for stock
under I.R.C. § 331 (1985). A distribution in partial liquidation (as defined by id. § 302(e)) will
qualify as a stock disposition only if made to a noncorporate shareholder. See id. § 302(b)(4).
Otherwise, a redemption will qualify as a disposition only if it is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend, substantially disproportionate, or results in a complete termination of the shareholder's
interest. See Id. § 302(b). The Internal Revenue Service has interpreted § 302(b) broadly in the
context of minority shareholders who have no semblance of control either before or after the re-
demption. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92 (finding that reduction in interest from
.0001118% to .0001081% is "meaningful" for purposes of § 302(b)(1)). As a result, shareholders
who redeem stock from publicly held corporations appear virtually assured of sale treatment unless
their proportionate interest remains exactly the same after the redemption as it was before.
79, See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4025, 4064-66 (The report suggested a statutory distinction in the consequences of
reorganizations depending on whether the corporate taxpayer was publicly traded or privately held.
The distinction was said to be justified because privately held firms are more likely to act in accord-
ance with specific tax avoidance plans of their shareholders.); see also Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau, &
Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to
Shareholders, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43-45, 53 n.100 (1952) [hereinafter Cohen, Surrey] (discussing
the possibility of a distinction for tax purposes between publicly traded and privately held corpora-
tions in the context of corporate distributions and stating that "most of the complexity arises because
of the problems presented by the closely-held family corporation, where it is nearly always possible,





The preferential treatment that remains for other distributions from closely
held corporations, primarily distributions in liquidation or in redemption of
stock held by minority shareholders, presents policy issues that are different
from those raised by distributions from publicly held firms. Continuing prefer-
ential treatment may be justified in the context of closely held corporations by a
congressional policy of bearing more lightly on small businesses.8 1 Other policy
concerns that are unique to that context can also be suggested. If a complete
liquidation involves a termination of the business in corporate form, a transac-
tion that is virtually limited to closely held corporations, it should perhaps be
facilitated by the tax code, especially when unsuccessful operations are in-
volved.8 2 Redemptions of stock by closely held corporations may also merit
special treatment. Because the stock is not publicly traded, sales will be difficult
to arrange and infrequent. The corporation may be the only potential purchaser
for a shareholder wishing to dispose of stock in a closely held corporation. Re-
demptions that effect changes of ownership in this context should perhaps be
facilitated, a goal that would justify the tax incentive offered by the redemption
provisions.
83
These suggested policy considerations clearly deserve further analysis and
discussion. They are not, however, relevant to determining the proper treatment
of distributions by publicly held corporations. Less attention has been focused
on the incentive effect of the tax provisions in this context. The issue may ini-
tially seem of less consequence, because the owners of the entity rarely are in a
position to structure the distribution for their individual tax benefit. Manage-
ment, however, presumably acts on behalf of the shareholders8 4 and will seek to
maximize the net value of any equity distribution. Accordingly, despite the sep-
80. To qualify under the "substantially disproportionate" test of I.R.C. § 302(b)(3) (1985), the
redemption must reduce the shareholder's voting control to less than 50%, in addition to accom-
plishing the specified percentage point reduction in ownership. In interpreting the "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" test of id. § 302(b)(1), the courts and the Service have also focused on the
loss of voting power, requiring a majority shareholder to relinquish effective control over corporate
policies and decisionmaking before a stock redemption will qualify as a sale. See, eg., Fehrs Fin. Co.
v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 938
(1974); Rev. Rul. 78-401, 1978-2 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111; see also Postlewaite &
Finneran, Section 302(b)(1): The Expanding Minnow, 64 VA. L. REV. 561, 564-69 (1978) (reviewing
the legislative history of § 302).
Another statutory provision enacted to prevent abuse in the context of closely held corporations
is I.R.C. § 341 (1985), dealing with "collapsible corporations." Designed to prevent the conversion
of ordinary income into capital gain at the shareholder level by means of a corporate liquidation, the
section treats shareholder gain on the liquidation or sale of a "collapsible corporation" as ordinary
income rather than as capital gain. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 112.01-12.09 (4th ed. 1979).
81. See Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of
Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 750 (1969).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1936), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B., pt. 2, at
667, 674; Andrews, "Out of Its Earnings and Profits'" Some Reflections on the Taxation of Divi-
dends, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1403, 1424 (1956).
83. See Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and Distributions,
33 TAX LAW. 743, 773-74 (1980); Chirelstein, supra note 81, at 749-50; Cohen, supra note 61, at 149.
84. See Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699, 712-13
(1981).
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aration of ownership and control, shareholder consequences will be of prime
importance, and a tax bias toward certain forms of distribution will significantly
affect corporate financial decisions.
It is difficult to defend on policy grounds the continuation of preferential
tax treatment for any distribution that is made to shareholders of a publicly held
corporation that continues its business in corporate form. Distributions that are
currently treated favorably, and so encouraged by the tax provisions, include
equity distributions in leveraged buyouts, whether the transaction is structured
as a purchase of target stock directly from the public shareholders or as a
purchase of the target's assets followed by a liquidation of the target firm. In
either case the funds are withdrawn from the corporate entity, eliminating cor-
porate tax on future yield, at the cost of only a capital gains tax to
shareholders.8
5
A similar tax incentive extends to shareholder distributions by a single cor-
poration that are structured as stock repurchases rather than as dividends.
Under current law repurchases are treated as sales to minority shareholders who
relinquish stock as long as the effect is a nominal reduction in the individual
shareholder's percentage interest,8 6 creating a strong bias toward distributing
corporate accumulations in this fashion. Because of the beneficial shareholder
tax consequences, stock repurchases have become more popular in recent years
as an alternative to dividends for publicly held corporations with excess funds
available for distribution.87 The tax incentives for repurchases have been subject
to increasing criticism. The revenue loss is difficult to defend, especially because
the non-tax differences between stock repurchases and dividends by a publicly
held corporation are often insignificant to either the corporation or its
shareholders.88
A proposal to eliminate tax incentives in the leveraged buyout context by
increasing the cost of shareholder withdrawals could offer the additional advan-
tage of reforming the widely criticized treatment of stock repurchases by pub-
licly held corporations. Such a broad reform would be more neutral than an
amendment to disallow the corporate interest deduction, as it clearly would be
designed to do more than simply reduce the growing trend toward highly lever-
85. The transactions are equivalent because of the deduction for dividends received that is
available under I.R.C. § 243(a) (1985), to a corporation that receives distributions from a 100%-
owned subsidiary. Because of this deduction, the acquiring corporation may purchase the target's
stock and retain the target as a subsidiary without the imposition of an additional corporate tax on
the target's cash flow. Accordingly, the future corporate tax on the yield from the sales proceeds
distributed to the public shareholders is eliminated (at the cost of the capital gains tax) without being
replaced by an equivalent future corporate tax on the yield from the acquired assets. See AMER.
LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 487-89. The same result, of course, occurs when
a corporation acquires assets of the target and the target liquidates, distributing the sales proceeds to
its shareholders who are taxed on their gain at the capital gains rate. But see infra notes 107-28 and
accompanying text (discussing changes in capital gains treatment made by the Tax Reform Act of
1986).
86. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92.
87. See, e.g., Loomis, Beating the Market by Buying Back Stock, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at
42.
88. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 471-73; Chirelstein, supra
note 81, at 756.
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aged acquisitions. Instead, a reform proposal that applied to capital gain distri-
butions-at least by publicly held corporations-would correct a serious
theoretical inconsistency that has been tolerated despite the lack of any clear
policy justification.8 9 Although the immediate impetus of the reform may be
leveraged buyouts, it would have a much more significant effect and would rep-
resent an important step toward achieving an internally consistent and coherent
tax structure.
The mechanics of a proposal to accomplish the desired reform merit future
detailed consideration. Several alternative possibilities should be explored: tax-
ing the shareholders who receive the distribution at ordinary rates; allocating the
distribution among all the shareholders for tax at ordinary rates; or imposing an
excise tax at the corporate level. Each of these proposals could increase the cost
of shareholder withdrawals that, under current law, are taxed only at the capital
gains rate.
The least desirable or effective of the reform possibilities would appear to be
the first, focusing only on those shareholders who dispose of their stock. Under
current law these shareholders are the only ones who are taxed on the transac-
tion, reporting as capital gain the excess of their amount realized over their basis
in the stock. Under the analysis, it is this preferential treatment that creates the
tax incentive to distribute corporate accumulations.
A proposal to tax these shareholders on their gain at ordinary rates would
not be sufficient to eliminate the tax incentive. By selling shares to third parties
immediately prior to the transaction, shareholders could realize their share of
corporate earnings at the capital gains rate without detriment to the purchasers.
The purchasers would simply take a basis in the shares equal to their cost, so
that they would realize little or no gain on subsequent corporate distributions
89. Although distinguishing between publicly traded and privately held corporations for tax
purposes would require a new statutory provision, it is not an unfamiliar idea. Such a distinction
was discussed in the reorganization context prior to adoption of the 1954 Code. See H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4064-66. It
previously had been considered by the American Law Institute in the context of corporate distribu-
tions. See Cohen, Surrey, supra note 79. Commentators have also recognized the distinctions be-
tween corporations that are publicly traded and those that are privately held. Some have argued that
the differences in types of transactions and characteristics of the stock are great enough to justify
different tax consequences. See, eg., Chirelstein, supra note 81, at 751-52 (suggesting a difference in
the tax treatment of redemptions from publicly traded corporations, when the non-pro rata aspect
results from independent investment decisions of the shareholders, and redemptions from closely
held firms, when the non-pro rata aspect is the result of planning and negotiation); Davies, Public
Stock Private Stock- A Model For the Corporate Income Tax, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 299 (1975) (sug-
gesting that stock is a different type of property when its value is derived from a public stock market,
justifying a complete distinction between the tax treatment of shareholders owning that stock and
those owning stock of a private corporation); Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation
of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967) (suggesting that shareholders of publicly traded
corporations, who have no semblance of control as do the shareholders in closely held corporations,
should be taxed annually on stock appreciation); Stone, supra note 61, at 938 n.140 (suggesting the
utility of the distinction in determining the tax consequences of stock dividends); see also Beghe,
supra note 83, at 773 (describing the differences in patterns and effective rates of taxation for public
and private corporations). The AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, considered
limiting its excise tax proposal, discussed infra text accompanying notes 100-06, to publicly held
corporations. Although the Study favored applying the reform to all corporations, it left the ques-
tion open as one deserving further study. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note
25, at 521-22.
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that were treated as sales. Accordingly, the ordinary tax rate would be effec-
tively avoided and replaced by the capital gains rate previously imposed as a
result of the sale. 90
In order to correct this result, the tax consequences to the recipient share-
holder would have to depend on the amount of the distribution rather than the
amount of gain. Stock basis, which reflects amounts taxed to other shareholders
as capital gains on sales, could not be used as an offset. Instead, the shareholder
would be taxed on the entire distribution at ordinary rates, at least to the extent
the distribution would have been taxed as a dividend. 91 Individual shareholders
could still take advantage of the more generous treatment of sales by selling their
stock prior to the disposition, realizing their share of corporate earnings at capi-
tal gains rate. A sale would not, however, provide a permanent escape from
ordinary tax for the gain realized by the seller. Under this proposal, the new
purchaser would, in effect, step into the shoes of the selling shareholder. Ac-
cordingly, the purchaser would pay tax at ordinary rates on the distribution even
if, to the purchaser, the amount represented a return of investment rather than
gain. 92 A new shareholder forced to report a return of investment as ordinary
income would then also have a capital loss on the accompanying disposition of
stock. The new shareholder's capital loss, which would equal the amount of the
distribution included in his or her cost, would offset the selling shareholder's
prior capital gain, and the net result to the shareholder group would be one tax
on corporate earnings at ordinary rates.
The adverse tax consequences to the purchaser would be reduced if the
purchase price were discounted by the market to take into account the subse-
quent ordinary tax burden. Such an adjustment, however, would be possible
only if the corporate distribution were anticipated and, even then, its accuracy
would be doubtful. In any case, shareholders could substantially reduce any
subsequent tax cost by selling shares to low-bracket or tax-exempt purchasers,
90. If, for example, a shareholder has a basis of $10 in his or her stock, which has a value of
$100, the shareholder could sell the stock to a third party and be taxed at the capital gains rate on
$90. The new purchaser would take a basis of $100 in the stock and would have no tax consequences
on a corporate distribution of $100 that was treated as a sale.
This analysis assumes that gain from stock sales to third parties will continue to be taxed at the
capital gains rate. If that result were changed, so that gain from stock sales to third parties were
taxed as ordinary income, the problem discussed in the text would be eliminated. Such a change,
however, would be inconsistent with the theoretical model discussed supra text accompanying notes
62-66. Under that model the corporate tax imposed on the yield from retained earnings compensates
for the privilege of shareholder deferral. If retained earnings could be taxed to shareholders on sales
at ordinary rates, the tax burden imposed on corporate accumulations would be too great. Financ-
ing with retained earnings (at least to the extent taxed to shareholders on sales) would be as disad-
vantageous as financing with new equity under current law. In both cases, the funds would generate
yield subject to corporate tax even though the amounts had been fully taxed to the shareholders. See
AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 433; see also infra notes 107-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the changes in capital gains treatment enacted by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 and their impact on this Article's analysis).
91. A distribution is taxed as a dividend to the extent the corporation has current or accumu-
lated earnings and profits. See I.R.C. § 316(a) (1985).
92. This result would be the same as in the case of any dividend distribution, when a share-
holder's tax consequences are controlled by the existence of corporate earnings and profits regardless
of whether the distribution represents gain to the individual shareholder. See United States v. Phel-
lis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
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who have little concern about a future tax. As a result, the ordinary rates im-
posed on the withdrawal would not be representative of the rates of the share-
holders, and the cost of the withdrawal could be minimized.
93
An alternative to focusing on only some of the shareholders would be to
allocate the tax burden among all of the shareholders, treating each shareholder
owning stock on the date of distribution as if he or she had received a propor-
tionate share as a dividend.94 The basis for this treatment ca. be seen by exam-
ining the effect of a non-pro rata repurchase of stock. The repurchase has two
consequences: funds are distributed out of the corporation and the relative per-
centage interests held by the shareholders change, with some shareholders in-
creasing their interests and others reducing or terminating their interests. The
exact same results could have been achieved in two separate steps. First, the full
amount withdrawn could have been distributed pro rata to all of the sharehold-
ers as a dividend. Second, the shareholders could have adjusted their investment
portfolios by purchases and sales among themselves, with those who increase
their percentage ownership using their dividend proceeds to purchase the sur-
rendered shares of the others.
9 5
The non-pro rata redemption shortcuts these two steps, combining them
into one. A strong argument can be made that the tax consequences of the
transaction should still follow the dividend-sale route, at least in the context of
publicly held corporations when the non-pro rata factor results from independ-
ent investment decisions of individual shareholders. 96 This proposal, which
would allocate the distribution among all shareholders for tax at ordinary rates,
recognizes that the remaining shareholders have increased their percentage own-
ership in the transaction only by relinquishing their share of the distributed
cash. The redeeming shareholders have received more than their share of the
distributed cash in exchange for their reduction in interest.
97
The allocation proposal was originally suggested in the context of stock
repurchases by publicly held corporations. However, it could be extended to
cover the equity distributions to shareholders in leveraged buyouts, whether the
transaction was structured as a purchase of stock or assets. In these cases, just
as in a stock repurchase, funds are withdrawn from the corporate entity and
93. An alternative method of allocating the distribution among only some of the shareholders
would be to allocate it among the continuing shareholders, rather than among only those who re-
ceive a portion of the distribution. See S. 2689, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. Rc. S7592 (1982)
(introduced by Sen. Danforth), which would treat "all purchases of stock of a publicly traded corpo-
ration by that publicly traded corporation or its affiliate during a calendar quarter... as a distribu-
tion of property to the shareholders of the publicly traded corporation on the first day of the
subsequent calendar quarter .... (emphasis added).
94. See Chirelstein, supra note 81 (suggesting this analysis in the context ofshare repurchasing
by publicly held corporations).
95. See Chirelstein, supra note 81, at 749.
96. See Chirelstein, supra note 81, at 751. Professor Chirelstein contrasts repurchases by pub-
licly held corporations with non-pro rata redemptions by private firms that are "necessarily the
product of negotiation and agreement among the shareholders." Id. at 750. According to Professor
Chirelstein, such negotiated redemptions are the type to which the preferential treatment of the
redemption provisions was intended to apply. Id. at 751.
97. See Chirelstein, supra note 81, at 749.
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freed from future corporate tax, without being replaced by assets newly subject
to the same tax burden. Any such distribution could be allocated to all share-
holders for tax at ordinary rates, at least to the extent that such a distribution
would have been taxed as a dividend.
98
Although the mechanics of this proposal may seem unfamiliar at first, they
are not especially complex. Each time a corporation made a distribution to
shareholders that was taxable to them as a sale, whether in the context of a
leveraged buyout or a repurchase of shares, the corporation would be required to
allocate the distributed earnings among its outstanding shares. Shareholders on
that date would be deemed to have received a dividend distribution in the
amount of their allocable share, and they would be so notified. The deemed
inclusion would be reflected by an equivalent basis increase in each shareholder's
stock. After making this adjustment, the shareholders who surrendered stock in
the transaction (as well as shareholders who subsequently sold their stock)
would compute gain or loss on the disposition under the normal rules. 99
This approach has considerable theoretical appeal, because the tax conse-
quences of corporate distributions would be equivalent regardless of the form.
Because no basis offset would be allowed, the same amount of the distribution,
measured by corporate earnings, would be subject to tax at ordinary rates as if a
dividend actually had been distributed. In addition, just as in the case of a divi-
dend, the rates of the entire group would determine the cost of the withdrawal,
instead of only the rates of the recipient shareholders. Avoidance of the ordi-
nary tax by an individual shareholder would still be possible by selling stock
prior to the corporate distribution. The same avoidance, however, is possible
prior to the distribution of any taxable dividend and would not appear to create
significant problems in the context of a publicly held corporation.
The major disadvantage of this approach, which is avoided by the next pro-
posal, is that it introduces accounting and reporting procedures that may seem
cumbersome. In a large, publicly held corporation allocating the distribution
among shareholders as of a given date and notifying them of their share may
impose an undue burden. Shareholders may not understand the procedure,
which involves a deemed receipt of ordinary income that must be added on to
their stock basis before they can compute gain or loss properly. Despite the
theoretical appeal, the mechanics of this proposal may be sufficiently complex so
98. See I.R.C. § 316(a) (1985) (limiting dividends, for tax purposes, to corporate earnings and
profits).
99. These results may be illustrated by an example given by Professor Chirelstein:
[A]ssume that A and B each own 100 shares of a publicly held corporation which has
1,000,000 shares outstanding and which decides to repurchase 50,000 shares of its own
stock at a total cost of $1,000,000. Assume that A, whose basis for his 100 shares is $2,500,
elects to retain all of his shares, while B, whose basis is $1,500, elects to sell all of his.
Under the view taken here, both A and B receive a taxable dividend of $100 ($1 per share).
A's basis is increased to $2,600, B's to $1,600. If the sale price of B's shares is $2,000, B
has a capital gain of $400 ($2,000, amount realized, less basis of $1,600) in addition to the
dividend of $100. Similarly, ifA later sells his shares for $2,000, he then has a capital loss
of $600 ($2,600, basis, less $2,000, amount realized) in addition to the $100 dividend previ-
ously included.
Chirelstein, supra note 81, at 752-53.
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that its adoption has little chance of success. The obstacles seem especially great
given the current public pressure to simplify the tax system.
A final proposal to increase the cost of withdrawals of corporate accumula-
tions would involve the imposition of an excise tax at the corporate level. This
proposal, set forth in detail in the 1982 American Law Institute Reporter's
Study on Distributions, 100 has the considerable appeal of simplicity. The tax
would be set at a flat rate and collected from the corporation. The tax conse-
quences to the shareholders would not be changed. Only those who received a
portion of the distribution would be taxed, and they would compute gain or loss
on dispositions of stock, regardless of the identity of the purchaser, according to
the normal rules.
Just as the other proposals would do, the excise tax would attempt to elimi-
nate the bias toward certain forms of corporate distributions. The tax would be
imposed whenever corporate earnings were distributed to shareholders and
taxed to them as amounts received in exchange for their stock. 10 1 These trans-
actions would be fairly easy to define and would include stock redemptions as
well as other equity withdrawals, such as corporate liquidating distributions and
corporate purchases of stock.10 2 The rate would be set so that it would approxi-
mate the difference between the capital gains tax actually imposed on the distri-
butions 10 3 and the ordinary tax that would have been imposed if the amount had
100. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 401-86.
101. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 442. Under the proposal of
the Reporter's Study, "nondividend distributions" (generally defined as distributions that are taxed
to shareholders as sales) are actually charged first against a "qualified contributed capital" account,
with the excise tax imposed only when that account is exhausted. The qualified capital account
basically consists of newly contributed equity capital and, as such, is somewhat similar to the con-
cept of a corporation's "capital account" under current laws. By charging distributions first against
that account, the Reporter's Study would revise current law, which deems dividend distributions to
come first out of corporate earnings and profits and other distributions (such as redemptions) to
consist of both earnings and profits and some amount of paid-in capital. Under the proposal of the
Reporter's Study, however, the charge to the qualified capital account imposes an implicit cost that
does not exist under current law-reductions in that account will decrease future deductions for
dividends, because those deductions are allowed only up to a specified percentage of the qualified
capital account. See id. at 452-53. Under the proposal if a nondividend distribution attracts an
excise tax and is also taxed to the recipient at ordinary rates because it is "dividend-equivalent," the
taxpayer would be entitled to a credit, on a grossed-up basis, for the corporate excise tax paid. See
id. at 443.
102. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 456-61. Under the proposal
"nondividend distributions" include "every distribution in liquidation or in redemption of shares
and every distribution of boot in a reorganization." Id. at 443. Any acquisition of a "direct invest-
ment" by one corporation in the stock of another is also treated as a nondividend distribution, with a
direct investment requiring either ownership of 50% of the common stock or 10% ownership with
designation of the holding as a direct investment. See id. at 490. In contrast to "direct investments"
are "portfolio investments." Portfolio investments are not considered nondividend distributions, but
the dividends received deduction is to be repealed for amounts received from such shares. These
proposals are explained in detail in the study itself. See id. at 487-513.
103. In fact, the capital gains tax will not actually be imposed on the entire amount of the
distribution. The recipient shareholder will pay tax at capital gains rate only to the extent the
amount realized exceeds his or her basis in the shares. To the extent the basis exceeds the amount of
the initial capital contribution allocable to the shares, it will represent gain that has been previously
taxed to the shareholders at capital gains rate as a result of prior sales (or, if the basis has been
stepped-up on death under I.R.C. § 1014 (1985), is to be treated as having been so taxed). To the
extent of the initial capital contribution, the basis offset will reduce the aggregate amount of the
distribution subject to shareholder capital gains tax. Allowing the basis offset on the distribution,
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been distributed as a dividend. 1 4 As a result of the excise tax, the total tax
burden levied on distributed corporate accumulations would be more nearly
equivalent regardless of the distribution's form. If profits were distributed as
dividends, shareholders themselves would pay tax at ordinary rates. If profits
were distributed in nondividend transactions that qualified for sale treatment,
the shareholders would be entitled to lower rates, but the distribution would also
be subject to the corporate excise tax intended to compensate for the
difference. 
10 5
A major problem in enacting the excise tax would be establishing an appro-
priate rate. Different corporations may attract shareholders with different mar-
ginal rates, and some firms may appeal to a greater number of tax-exempt
shareholders than others. To retain its simplicity, the excise tax could not de-
pend on these variations in shareholder groups, but would have to be set inde-
pendently. Perhaps, as suggested by the American Law Institute Reporter's
Study, the weighted marginal average tax rate of shareholders could be used as a
guide to the normal tax on dividends. The excise tax rate then could be com-
puted by reducing that rate by the weighted average capital gains tax rate that
would represent the actual cost to the shareholders of a withdrawal that was
treated as a sale. Changes to the excise tax rate would be necessary whenever
the individual rate structure is revised.
10 6
Although the excise tax approach may seem unfamiliar, it is a proposal that
deserves attention. Considerable thought has gone into its design, and the Re-
porter's Study contains suggested statutory language in addition to extensive
comments on the problems of implementation, transition rules, and the effects
on other statutory provisions. The proposal in the Reporter's Study was
designed to eliminate the bias under current law in favor of nondividend distri-
butions that are taxed to shareholders at the capital gains rate. Once proponents
of reform in the leveraged buyout context recognize that the incentive for that
transaction is the same as the bias with which the Reporter's Study was con-
cerned, they can begin to focus on the details of the excise tax proposal as a
however, is a matter of deferral rather than exemption, because it decreases the remaining aggregate
shareholder basis that can be distributed to the shareholders free of tax. See AMER. LAW INST.,
REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 447.
As noted previously, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made significant changes in the taxation of
capital gains. The Afterword to this Article discusses these changes and their impact on the Arti-
cle's analysis. See infra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
104. See AMER. LAV INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 445-51 (discussing the fac-
tors to be considered in setting an appropriate excise tax rate). 4
105. Differences would remain because the shareholder basis offset would be allowed on certain
distributions and not on others. These differences would be ones of timing of the shareholder capital
gains tax and would not provide complete tax exemption.
106. See AMER. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 25, at 445-51. Although the excise
tax rate could be set to reflect the approximate difference between the average shareholder taxes on
ordinary income and capital gain, it can never achieve complete equivalence between corporate re-
tention and distribution for all taxpayers, who are subject to different rates of tax. See Warren, supra
note 58, at 761-72 (arguing that integration is a preferable solution to the excise tax, while agreeing
that the excise tax as proposed by the REPORTER'S STUDY "is theoretically preferable to current
law"). Id. at 772.
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reform alternative. The simplicity of its accounting and collection procedures
offers a great deal to commend it.
V. CONCLUSION
As leveraged buyouts have become more popular, the debate about their
inherent benefits and risks has intensified. An important issue in this debate is
the incentive effect of the tax provisions. Most would agree that a goal of sound
tax policy should be to minimize the influence of tax considerations in corporate
acquisitions, so that business decisions are motivated by financial and economic
factors rather than by tax savings.
In the recent debate over leveraged buyouts, reform proposals have focused
on the incentive effect of the corporate interest deduction. This analysis, how-
ever, ignores the work that has been done in an attempt to explain and describe
the relationship between the corporate and the individual tax structures. From
this work, a theoretical model has been derived which, under assumed condi-
tions, achieves neutrality between the distribution and the retention of corporate
earnings. The currently accepted tax consequences of leveraged buyouts clearly
deviate from this model. The primary structural deviation, however, is not the
corporate interest deduction. Instead, the structural inconsistency results from
the preferential capital gains tax that is imposed on the shareholder withdrawals.
The lower cost results in a strong incentive to engage in leveraged buyouts, in-
curring debt in order to make distributions to shareholders, regardless of finan-
cial or economic justifications.
The incentive in the leveraged buyout context clearly is not unique to that
transaction, but exists whenever shareholders are taxed on equity distributions
as sales. Proposals to eliminate this bias in other contexts, such as stock repur-
chases, deserve serious consideration. The American Law Institute Reporter's
Study is of prime relevance, because the excise tax it proposes was specifically
designed to deal with the tax bias toward certain forms of shareholder distribu-
tions. The excise tax would eliminate the bias in a fairly simple fashion, by
adding the cost of a corporate excise tax to distributions that are taxed to share-
holders at lower, preferential rates. As a result of this additional cost, the aggre-
gate tax imposed on the withdrawal would approximate the cost of an equivalent
dividend distribution, taxed to the shareholders at the higher, ordinary rates.
The incentive toward distribution would disappear, and the tax provisions
would maintain neutrality between corporate distribution and retention.
The most effective reform in the leveraged buyout context would not focus
on that transaction alone. Instead, it would recognize that leveraged buyouts
provide a particularly striking example of a more general problem-the tax in-
centive that results from the inconsistent tax treatment accorded to shareholder
distributions. The incentive would be eliminated most effectively by a broad
reform, such as the excise tax, that would subject all shareholder distributions to
an equivalent tax burden. Such a reform, motivated perhaps by leveraged
buyouts but with a more far-reaching effect, would be a significant step toward
achieving an internally coherent tax structure and a neutral tax policy.
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AFTERWORD
This Article was completed in the spring of 1986, before Congress passed
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in September of that year.10 7 That legislation made
two changes in the tax laws that are especially significant to the Article's analy-
sis of leveraged buyouts.
First, the Tax Reform Act substantially reduced the top marginal rates for
individuals and corporations. Assuming the amendments go into effect as
scheduled, the top marginal rate for individuals, beginning in 1988, will be
twenty-eight percent,10 8 down from fifty percent; 10 9 the top corporate rate will
be thirty-four percent, 110 down from forty-six percent.111 Although the rate
reductions are significant, the primary importance of the new rates for purposes
of this Article lies in the changed relationship between the individual and corpo-
rate top rates. For the first time corporations will generally be taxed at a rate
that is higher than that imposed on their individual shareholders.
The second significant change is that, after the Tax Reform Act becomes
effective, capital gains will no longer be subject to preferential treatment.
112
However, the statutory structure that characterizes gain or loss as ordinary or
capital was retained and remains relevant in applying the limits on deductions
for capital losses. 13 The legislative history further justifies its retention "to fa-
cilitate reinstatement of a capital gains rate differential if there is a future tax
rate increase."' 1 4 Clearly, the capital gains preference may return to the tax
law. Under the current Code, however, starting in 1988, capital gains will be
taxed the same as ordinary income for the first time since 1921.115
107. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). The Tax Reform Act
was passed by Congress on September 27, 1986, and signed by President Reagan on October 22,
1986.
108. I.R.C. § 1 (Vest 1986). In 1987 the top marginal rate for individuals will be 38.5%. Id.
§ 1(h).
109. I.R.C. § 1 (1985).
110. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1986).
111. I.R.C. § 11 (1985).
112. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 Stat. 2085, xxx (1986) (repeal-
ing the 60% capital gains deduction for individuals); id. § 311, at xx (repealing the top 28% capital
gains rate for corporations). Capital gains recognized by individuals will still be subject to a prefer-
ence in 1987, when the top rate for capital gains will be 28% despite the top rate for ordinary income
of 38.5%. See I.R.C. § 1(j) (West 1986). Under § 1(j) capital gains will be subject to a preferential
rate of 28% in any year in which the highest stated rate for individuals is greater than 28%. Id.
113. I.R.C. § 1211 (West 1986). Because of these continued limitations, capital gains will still be
preferred over ordinary income by taxpayers who realize capital losses. Such losses are deductible
only to the extent of capital gains and, for individuals, an additional $3000.
114. S. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 106 (1986).
115. See Clark, supra note 55, at 104 n.61 (a brief summary of the preferences for capital gains
since 1921). Under I.R.C. § 1()(2)(B) (West 1986), a preferential rate of 28% will automatically
apply to capital gains if, in any future year, the top stated rate for individuals is higher than that.
In another change that is relevant to the tax consequences of leveraged buyouts, the Tax Re-
form Act repealed the "General Utilities" rule, discussed supra note 52. That rule provided for the
nonrecognition of gain (with some exceptions, such as recapture) to a liquidating corporation on a
sale or distribution. Nonrecognition was of substantial benefit in leveraged buyouts as well as in
other acquisitions because the acquiring corporation could obtain a stepped-up basis in the target's
assets without a full corporate level tax imposed on the target. The rule had been widely criticized
and, according to the legislative history of the Act, was thought "to create significant distortions in
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The Article concludes that the primary tax incentive for leveraged buyouts
has been the preference for capital gains at the shareholder level rather than the
interest deduction to the corporation. The repeal of the capital gains preference
raises the question whether that incentive has now been eliminated. A reconsid-
eration of the model discussed in the Article illustrates that the answer to that
question is clearly no. Under the new rates corporations will have a stronger
incentive to distribute rather than retain funds. Even without the preferential
rate for capital gains, certain forms of distributions to shareholders will continue
to be tax-preferred. Accordingly, the tax bias toward these forms of distribu-
tion, including leveraged buyouts and stock repurchases, will remain as a signifi-
cant factor in corporate financial decisions.
The model described in the Article illustrates that, under certain assump-
tions concerning tax rates and yields, corporate retention of earnings is
equivalent to a distribution of those funds to shareholders. Retention defers tax
at the shareholder level, but the future yield from the retained earnings is subject
to corporate tax in addition to the eventual shareholder tax imposed on distribu-
tion. If corporate and individual rates are equal and if all forms of withdrawal
are taxed at the same rate to shareholders, the continued corporate tax on the
yield exactly compensates for the shareholder deferral of tax. Under these as-
sumptions shareholder wealth would be unaffected by a corporate decision to
retain or distribute funds, and corporate financing and distribution decisions
would depend on non-tax factors.
The Article focuses on the difference in shareholder tax rates that applied to
different forms of distributions, arguing that the lower rate for capital gains en-
couraged leveraged buyouts. It does not discuss the fact that shareholder and
corporate tax rates were not the same: Prior to the Tax Reform Act the top
corporate rate was forty-six percent,1 16 compared to a top shareholder rate of
fifty percent.11 7 Theoretically, this difference created a bias toward corporate
retention over distribution, because the continued corporate tax on the yield
would not fully compensate for the shareholder deferral. The tax penalties on
accumulated earnings and personal holding companies were enacted to counter
the tax incentive to retain, which was seen as a problem primarily in the context
business behavior" and "may be responsible, at least in part, for the dramatic increase in corporate
mergers and acquisitions in recent years." See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 281-82
(1985).
I.R.C. § 336 (West 1986) provides that "gain or loss shall be recognized to a liquidating corpo-
ration on the distribution of property in complete liquidation as if such property were sold to the
distributee at its fair market value." Id. The rules in I.R.C. § 337 (1985) providing for nonrecogni-
tion on liquidating sales also have been repealed. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 631, 100 Stat. 2085, xxx. Accordingly, whether a sale of assets actually takes place or whether the
sale is deemed to occur in the context of an election under I.R.C. § 338 (West 1986), a basis step-up
in the target's assets can be achieved only at the cost of a full corporate level tax on all inherent asset
gain. See also id. § 1060 (governing the allocation of the purchase price in asset acquisitions and
adopting the rule of the § 338 regulations, discussed supra note 52).
116. I.R.C. § 11 (1985).
117. See id. §§ 1, 11. The incentives caused by differences between corporate and shareholder
rates are discussed supra note 66.
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of closely held firms.118
The Tax Reform Act has significantly affected the bias toward corporate
retention. Starting in 1988 the top corporate rate will be higher than the top
individual rate: thirty-four percent as compared to twenty-eight percent. Re-
tention of corporate funds will no longer be the most beneficial strategy from a
tax perspective. Continued corporate tax on yield-the cost of retention-will
almost certainly be greater than the cost of the immediate shareholder tax trig-
gered by a distribution. Accordingly, corporations will now have a stronger in-
centive to distribute funds in order to minimize taxes and maximize the wealth
of their shareholders.1 19
Given the increased incentive to distribute, any tax preference for certain
forms of distribution will be significant. In the past the major tax preference for
certain distributions has been the shareholder capital gains rate. The Tax Re-
form Act has removed that benefit, but it has not eliminated the tax preference
for distributions that are treated as dispositions rather than as dividends. The
continuing incentive to distribute funds in leveraged buyouts or in non-pro rata
stock repurchases arises from the different rules governing the computation of
shareholder gain. These rules allow basis offset for dispositions but not for
dividends.
In a non-pro rata redemption or a leveraged buyout, the corporation dis-
tributes funds to some but not all of the shareholders. As a result of the distri-
bution, the relative percentage interests of the shareholders change, with some
shareholders increasing their interests and others reducing or eliminating their
interests. Alternatively, the corporation could have distributed the same
amount of funds as a pro rata dividend to all shareholders. The dividend distri-
bution could have been followed by purchases and sales among the shareholders,
with those who increase their percentages using their dividend proceeds to
purchase the shares of the others. 120 The non-tax consequences of these two
alternatives are the same, and yet, even without capital gains, the shareholder
118. See Clark, supra note 55, at 102-04.
119. The Tax Reform Act has strengthened the bias toward distribution over retention in an-
other way. Under the model the continued corporate tax on yield is justified as compensation for the
shareholder deferral of tax. As explained supra note 63, the benefit from that deferral has always
been reduced by the possibility of shareholder stock sales to purchasers other than the corporation.
Upon a sale of stock the selling shareholder is taxed on corporate accumulations to the extent re-
flected in stock appreciation. In the past that tax has been at the preferential capital gains rate. If
distributions were all to be taxed at the ordinary tax rates, as the model assumes, the shareholders
would still enjoy some benefit from the deferral as long as the funds were retained despite the imposi-
tion of some tax on stock sales. Although the corporate tax may have overcompensated for this
deferral benefit to the extent of shareholder tax on sales, a rough equivalence was achieved.
With the elimination of the preferential rate for capital gains, corporate earnings that are taxed
to shareholders on sales of stock will be taxed at the same rate as corporate earnings that are distrib-
uted. Accordingly, to the extent of gain recognized on sales, the shareholders will enjoy no further
benefit from deferral. To be consistent with the model, the full tax to the shareholders should justify
calling off the corporate tax on the yield. Yet the corporate tax will continue to be imposed until an
actual distribution occurs. This result should also strengthen the corporate bias toward distribution
over retention.




tax consequences would encourage a corporation to choose the first form of
distribution.
In a leveraged buyout or a non-pro rata redemption, the distribution is
treated as a sale. 12 1 Thus, shareholders are allowed to reduce the amount re-
ported as gain by their basis in their stock sold or redeemed. In contrast, when
funds are distributed as a dividend, there is no basis offset and the shareholders
are taxed on the full amount distributed to the extent of corporate earnings and
profits.122 In addition to the shareholder tax imposed on the full amount of the
dividend distribution, the subsequent sales to achieve the ownership changes will
also trigger tax consequences. As a result, the shareholder group will be subject
to additional tax liability that could have been avoided if the distribution itself
were treated as the disposition transaction.
The difference in the amount of shareholder gain can be illustrated most by
a simple example of a corporation owned equally by two shareholders. Assume
the corporation is worth 500 dollars, its earnings and profits account is 400 dol-
lars, and each shareholder has a 50 dollar basis in her stock. If the corporation
distributes 250 dollars to one shareholder in a distribution that is treated as a
sale, the selling shareholder will have a gain of 200 dollars. The remaining
shareholder will have no tax consequences, although, after the distribution, she
will own 100 percent of the stock.
Alternatively, if the corporation were to distribute the 250 dollars as a pro
rata dividend, the entire amount would be taxed as a dividend to the sharehold-
ers. Each shareholder's stock would be reduced in value to 125 dollars, and one
shareholder could then use her dividend funds to purchase the entire stock inter-
est of the other. The selling shareholder would realize a 75 dollar gain on the
sale (125 dollars realized less the 50 dollar basis) for a total shareholder gain of
325 dollars, or 125 dollars more than under the first alternative.
The advantage of the first alternative is one of deferral. The shareholder
group realizes 125 dollars less gain on the transaction, but the remaining share-
holder has 200 dollars of inherent gain in her stock; the stock is worth 250
dollars and the basis is 50 dollars. Under the second alternative the immediate
gain to the shareholders is increased by 125 dollars, but the inherent gain to the
remaining shareholder is reduced by the same amount. After purchasing the
other shareholder's stock, her basis in stock worth 250 dollars would be 175
dollars, leaving inherent gain of only 75 dollars. Although the benefit is one of
deferral rather than complete exemption, it can still be a significant advantage to
the shareholders.
The same advantage can be illustrated in a leveraged buyout context. As-
sume that a corporation is worth one million dollars and has two groups of
shareholders: the public, which owns eighty percent, and the insiders, who own
twenty percent. The corporation has 900,000 dollars of earnings and profits.
121. See supra notes 43, 78.
122. See I.R.C. §& 301(c), 316(a) (1985).
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The public has an aggregate basis of 80,000 dollars and the insiders a basis of
20,000 dollars.
In a leveraged buyout the public will receive funds out of the corporation in
a transaction that is treated as a sale. If the corporation in the example distrib-
utes 800,000 dollars to the public, the aggregate shareholder gain, realized by
the public shareholders, will be 720,000 dollars. The insiders will have no tax
consequences as a result of the transaction.
If, alternatively, the corporation had distributed 800,000 dollars to its
shareholders as a pro rata dividend, the full amount would have been taxed:
640,000 dollars to the public and 160,000 dollars to the insiders. After the dis-
tribution the stock of the public would be reduced in value to 160,000 dollars,
and the insiders could purchase it using their dividend funds. The public would
realize an additional gain of 80,000 dollars on the sale (160,000 dollars reduced
by their 80,000 dollar basis), and the insiders would increase their basis by
160,000 dollars. As a result, the aggregate shareholder gain realized on the
transactions would be 880,000 dollars (800,000 dollars in dividends and 80,000
dollars on the sale), or 160,000 dollars more gain than if the 800,000 dollars had
been distributed in a leveraged buyout.
123
The difference in the amount of shareholder gain will continue to create a
tax bias toward those forms of distribution that are treated as sales. The alloca-
123. As in the first example, the benefit is one of deferral. The increased $160,000 of shareholder
gain in the dividend alternative is balanced by the $160,000 increase in the basis of the insiders'
stock. After the leveraged buyout, the insiders had inherent gain of $180,000 (basis of $20,000 in
stock worth $200,000); after the dividend and sales, their inherent gain is reduced by $160,000 to
$20,000 (basis of $180,000 in stock worth $200,000).
The same bias toward distributions in leveraged buyouts will exist if the two groups have in-
creased their bases by sales prior to the distribution. Assume the public has a basis of $800,000 and
the insiders have a basis of $200,000. If the corporation repurchases the public stock for $800,000,
the public shareholders will realize no gain. If the corporation instead distributes the $800,000 as a
dividend, the full amount will be taxed: $640,000 to the public, $160,000 to the insiders. The public
will then have a $640,000 capital loss on the sale of their stock. Ignoring the limits on deduction of
capital losses, the loss to the public will balance their dividend income. The total gain to the share-
holders, however, will be $160,000 (the amount taxed to the insiders as a dividend) instead of zero.
The advantage is, again, one of deferral. Under the second alternative, the insiders will have an
inherent loss in their stock of $160,000, because their basis has been increased to $360,000 in stock
now worth $200,000.
This last example illustrates the "miracle of income without gain," which the Supreme Court
approved more than 60 years ago in United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921). See Powell,
Income from Corporate Dividends, 35 HARV. L. REV. 363 (1922). Thus, both groups of shareholders
are taxed on dividends even though the distributions do not represent gain to them. Dividend in-
come to shareholders depends only on corporate earnings and profits, which must be fully exhausted
before any portion of capital is deemed withdrawn. Under this rule shareholders may, as in the
example, be forced to pay tax on corporate distributions that represent a return of their investment.
The extra gain to the shareholder is then balanced by an inherent capital loss in the shareholder's
stock, and the additional tax liability on the dividend is theoretically balanced by the tax benefit from
the loss.
This rule is changed when a distribution is treated as a sale, such as a distribution in a leveraged
buyout or in a non-pro rata redemption. In those cases the current investments of the selling share-
holders determine the amount of gain realized. A portion of the distribution is treated as a with-
drawal of initial capital contributions, tax-free to the shareholders, regardless of the existence of
corporate earnings and profits. This latter rule, of course, is far more advantageous to the share-
holder group.
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tion proposal, discussed in the Article, could eliminate that bias. 124 Under that
proposal a distribution out of corporate funds, without replacement by assets
newly subject to the same corporate tax burden, would always be allocated
among the shareholders and taxed as a dividend to the extent of corporate earn-
ings and profits. These distributions would include stock repurchases and distri-
butions to the public in a leveraged buyout, whether the transactions were
structured as an asset purchase or as a purchase of target stock. 125 The share-
holders would be taxed on their pro rata share of the distribution, but would
then be entitled to increase their stock basis by the same amount. Shareholders
would then compute gain or loss on the sale of stock under the normal rules,
regardless of whether the sale occurred in the distribution transaction or
subsequently.
In the above example the 800,000 dollars distributed to the public share-
holders would be taxed as if it had been distributed to all in proportion to their
interests: 640,000 dollars to the public and 160,000 dollars to the insiders. Both
groups would then increase their stock basis by that amount. The public would
then report 80,000 dollars in additional gain on its sale of stock: the 800,000
dollars realized reduced by their new basis of 720,000 dollars (their old basis of
80,000 dollars increased in the manner described). Under this approach the
total shareholder gain would be 880,000 dollars, just as if the corporation had
distributed the 800,000 dollars as a dividend and the insiders had then
purchased the stock of the public to bring their interest up to 100 percent.
The allocation proposal would solve the incentive to structure distributions
in certain forms, but the bias toward distribution over retention would remain as
a serious consequence of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The disincentive to accu-
mulate corporate earnings can be expected to have a significant effect on corpo-
rate financial decisions. Debt financing will become much more attractive than
equity financing, whether the equity is newly contributed or accumulated. Fur-
thermore, the bias against corporate retention may also have a significant effect
on the forms of new businesses. Incorporation will become far less attractive
unless a Subchapter S election 126 is possible, and new types of limited partner-
ships should become more popular. 127 It is doubtful that Congress fully consid-
124. The allocation proposal, which was proposed in Chirelstein, supra note 81, is discussed
supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
The Article concludes that imposing an excise tax on the corporation would be the most effec-
tive way to achieve consistency among types of shareholder distributions. As mentioned supra note
103, that proposal did not fully correct the inconsistency in the treatment of shareholder basis.
However, it did deal with the incentive effect of the preferential rate in a manner that seemed rela-
tively simple and administratively feasible. In light of the Tax Reform Act's repeal of the preferen-
tial rate for capital gains, the excise tax has become impractical. As a result, the allocation proposal,
which would treat all shareholder distributions as pro rata dividends to the extent of earnings and
profits, seems the only effective reform.
125. As described supra note 85, these transactions are equivalent because of the deduction for
dividends received that is available under I.R.C. § 243(a) (1985) to a corporation that receives distri-
butions from a 100%-owned subsidiary. See supra note 85.
126. I.R.C. § 1362 (1985).
127. See, e.g., Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the Methodical Disincorporation of America
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnerships Onto C Corporations, Running Amok with
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ered or intended these effects of the Tax Reform Act. Hopefully, the new biases
against the corporate form will be analyzed seriously and reduced, possibly
through some form of integration, in future Treasury proposals to reform the
corporate tax structure.
1 28
the Master Limited Partnership Concept, and Generally Endeavoring to Defeat the Intention of the
Draftsman of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64 TAXES 962 (1986).
128. The Treasury has been directed by the Conference Committee to "consider whether
changes to the provisions of subchapter C (relating to the income taxation of corporations and of
their shareholders) and related sections of the Code are desirable, and to report to the tax-writing
committees no later than January 1, 1988." See S. REP. No. 99-841, supra note 114, pt. 2, at 207.
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